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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ANTITERRORIST COOPERATION WITH FRENCH POLICE DISCLOSED

Athens TO VIMA TIS KYRIAKIS in Greek 22 May 83 p 8

/Article by N. Khasapopoulos/

/Excerpt/ About 3 months ago, Greek and French police authorities began close collaboration for confronting the increasing level of international terrorism, This collaboration became even closer following the explosion of the car bomb in Psykhiko that targeted the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Athens, as well as two other smaller bombings last week targeting Libyans and Syrians, also in Psykhiko.

As has been revealed, French anti-terrorist squad officers have already informed their Greek colleagues about possible terrorist attacks on American, French and Italian targets in Greece, coming after the signing of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement on the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Lebanon.

Possible future targets are considered as being the embassies of the United States, France and Italy, i.e. the three countries maintaining military forces that make up the peacekeeping forces in Beirut. According to exclusive information, authorities have already given order to beef up guarding procedures of these embassies.

Greek police have at this very moment data available about possible terrorist attacks in Greece. According to verified information, Greek police recently came into direct understandings with their French colleagues and exchanged information.

At the same time, although about 1-1/2 months have elapsed since the frightful bomb explosion that targeted the Saudi Arabian ambassador and a week since the bombings against Syrian and Libyan targets, Greek authorities have nothing concrete on the identity of the culprits. There was nothing whatsoever except for the one announcement by the "Revolutionary People's Solidarity Group" that assumed responsibility for the first (considered by most as the most serious) bombing in Psykhiko.

Immediately after the recent explosions in Psykhiko against Syria and Palestine an unidentified person telephoned the AFP in Athens and assumed responsibility for the attack. Speaking in fluent French and a clear voice, the unidentified

individual said that there was a group of "martyrs of Sartawi" that has undertaken actions to punish those whom it considers as the "instigators" in the assassination of the moderate and personal friend of Yasser Arafat, Palestinian leader, in Portugal.

However, the peculiar thing in this whole affair is that both Palestinian and Syrian diplomats in Athens doubt the existence of such a group. These diplomats say, "If such a group existed it would already have become known to Palestinian circles." The Libyans specifically do not want to hear or talk about the fact that Palestinians many have been found to attack them.

On the other hand, diplomatic circles of the so-called conservative Arab countries do not exclude "various contending factions in Lebanon" from hiding behind these sudden attacks in Greece. There are also Arab diplomats who believe that behind all of these "terrorist actions," as they are described, are the secret services of Israel, the primary goal being the disruption of Greek-Arab relations.

Besides the above, however, Greek police authorities are also examining one other aspect of these bombings. Specifically, they are investigating a piece of information that originated in a European country that the bombs were possibly placed by Iranian followers of Khomeyni over the position of the Arabs in the Iranian-Iraqi war.

What is, nevertheless, significant is that now many European police forces are working together for preventing future terrorist acts. Interest has also been shown by the Arabs. Two high-ranking Saudi Arabian police officers have come to Athens to work with and exchange information with their Greek colleagues.

Both the Saudi Arabians who urgently came to Athens, as well as INTERPOL are informing Greek authorities about the conclusions of the secret anti-terrorist meeting held in Paris in the first part of 1983 and which were reiterated last month in the utmost secrecy.

Besides the above, however, INTERPOL has repeatedly sent messages to Greek authorities informing them that Abu Nidal was going to hit targets in Greece. In fact, these messages mentioned that "the possible timing of these attacks will be spring." INTERPOL also provided a list of possible Abu Nidal targets. Included in this list of targets was the Saudi Arabian embassy in Psykhiko.

There is also another piece of information that must not be neglected, even though it has no connection with the Arabs, and which shows the collaboration of the Greek authorities with European police. Shortly after the discovery that the third individual implicated in the attempt on the life of Pope John II, namely the Turk Bekir Tselenk, had been operating in Greece, Mr Corona, the chief of Italian general security, came to Athens three times in the utmost secrecy and worked together with his Greek colleagues. Nothing, however, has been revealed about these meetings. The last time the Italians worked with Greek police was after the bombing in Didymoteikhon.

PEAT PRODUCTION IN NORTH BEING SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 30 Apr 83 p 28

[Text] Vapo reduces its peat production. Most significantly it affects Northern Finland where the production goal has been set below half of last year's.

At the same time, there are hundreds of machinery contractors and drivers who will become unemployed next summer. The reason for the reduction in peat production is the decline in demand for milled peat, as well as the large stocks from last summer.

Vapo produced approximately 16 million cubic meters of peat last year. Of that amount the production areas in the provinces of Oulu and Lapland covered 2.7 million cubic meters.

During last summer's high season there were 550 drivers with their tractors as well as 120 men from Vapo working in Vapo's Northern Finland swamps. In addition to that, there were 20-30 employees hired from outside for the preparatory work.

There is still 1.7 million cubic meters of last summer's good peat yield in Vapo's Northern Finland stocks. Therefore, next summer's production level was dropped almost by half compared to the year before, in other words it is now approximately one million cubic meters.

The drop in production means that hundreds of peat workers will be unemployed. Vapo and the representatives of the contractors discussed next summer's job sites in Oulu on Tuesday.

Stocks Are Being Filled

"Last summer we produced so much peat that we could meet next winter's demand without any production this year. However, we need production to fill the security stocks and to provide employment," said Aatos Peltoniemi, chief of Vapo's northern Finland district.

In northern Finland Vapo's biggest clients are the energy companies of Oulu and Kajaani, Kajaani Oy, and the most recent is Kemi Oy. However, Kajaani Oy is increasing its consumption of coal, due to coal's low world market price.

Kajaani Oy has used 300,000 cubic meters of peat per year for its energy production. According to Seppo Mononen, director of technical divisions, within two years the price of coal had fallen from 400 to 300 markkas per ton as delivered to Kajanni. Furthermore, it is easy for temporary users to get hold of cheap coal batches available in the spot market.

According to Jaakko Talsi, vice president of Kajaani Oy, the company will not totally give up using coal, although there is a temptation to buy cheap batches of coal. "The use of peat must be evaluated against its impacts in the long run, as well as how it affects the employment in the area," said Mr Talsi.

The contract between Kajaani Oy and Vapo expires in August. The energy company of the city of Oulu uses annually 1.1 million cubic meters of peat. Vapo delivers approximately half of it and Turveruukki Oy the other half. Despite coal, Turveruukki counts on the growth in peat demand and draws its production curve as it did last summer.

According to Terho Kaijansaari, director of the energy department of the city of Oulu, the state should subsidize the price of peat, because the world market price of coal is artificially kept low.

The freight costs alone make one quarter of peat's price. Also the employment opportunities within the peat production would justify a subvention from the state," said Mr Kaijansaari.

According to Mr Kaijansaari, Oulu has not yet considered a switch over to coal. This change would take a year and a half in the energy department of Oulu, due to the changes.

12190

CSO: 3617/117

FIRST TEST DRILLING NORTH OF 62 DEGREES PROVES POSITIVE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 May 83 p 21

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll]

[Text] Statoil has now completed testing of the first oil find north of 62 degrees latitude with good results. The Oil Directorate designates the find in Block 6407/1 at Haltenbanken as interesting, but it is still too early to say whether the field can be a basis for future production.

The information from this first drilling in the block indicates that a few hundred million barrels of oil can be recovered. Geological indications suggest that another structure nearby may also contain oil. If this is true, the total reserves can be at least twice as large, AFTENPOSTEN was told. Previous estimates were even more optimistic.

The test results show that the oil is very light with a good bit of condensate and gas mixed in. It is therefore not purely an oil field, but a field with gas as well. A field that is purely oil would have been easier to develop than a field that gives both oil and gas. The Oil Directorate indicated earlier that a field that is purely oil could be developed if the recoverable reserves made up more than 50 million tons, that is, about 370 million barrels.

Test production gave a result about 2,900 barrels of oil per day and 394,000 cubic meters of gas per day from a nozzle opening of 19 millimeters. The well was bored from the "Dyvi Delta" boring platform in an area of 273 meters water depth. The drilling was concluded at 4,530 meters under the sea level.

"We also think this find is very interesting in Statoil. This is confirmed by Statoil's and the Oil Directorate's evaluations indicating that the southwestern part of Haltenbanken might be an interesting oil area," Statoil's press spokesman, Hakon Lavik, said to AFTENPOSTEN. Lavik also stresses that the drilling of this hole could be finished during the winter months if the weather conditions do not create special problems.

Statoil plans to drill a new hole in this block later this year.

9124

CSO: 3639/115

BRIEFS

COSTLY TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT--The various execution phases of the Technological Development Plan, which was made public yesterday by Industry Minister Baiao Horta, will involve spending approximately 34 million contos during the next 10 years. Baiao Horta revealed some of the plan's details during the official inauguration ceremony of the Luniar Technological Complex's National Engineering and Industrial Technology Laboratory (LNETI). He added that, in theory, 60 percent of that total will be provided by public entities and 40 percent by private initiative. As we report in detail on page 9, the minister added that expenditure signifies an increase from 0.12 to 0.4 percent of the portion of GNP to be spent on industrial research and development until 1993. Baiao Horta underscored that the Technological Development Plan for Industrial Support "is a concrete means of action which has been put in proper sequence for modernizing Portugal technologically and for developing a vigorously innovative mentality in the nation's industry." [Excerpts] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 10 May 83 p 1] 9935

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE--According to data made public by the Labor Ministry, the unemployment rate in our country for the first 6 months of 1982 was 7.2 percent, which corresponds to about 310,000 unemployed. This unemployment rate, which at the time was lower than the rate in the EEC countries, differs from the estimates made by the labor federations. The CGTP's [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical] figures put the number of unemployed at about 480,000 to 500,000 and the UGT's [General Union of Workers] at 370,000 to 450,000. [Text] [Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 May 83 p 16] 9935

CSO: 3542/129

ENERGY MINISTRY ROLE IN BOOSTING EXPORTS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 May 83 p 9

[Article by Meral Tamer]

[Text] Now that export fall-off has become a fact rather than a chance, speculations concerning corrective measures have gained momentum. Often mentioned in these speculations is the viewpoint that a substantial role could be assigned to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources which directs the country's oil purchases to bolster exports.

Experts point out that almost every nation in the world which cares about exports adjusts imports to exports, and speak of the advantage of directing oil purchases towards those countries which have the potential of buying from us.

More than two thirds of Turkey's annual oil need of about 15 million tons is already purchased from Iran and Iraq, that is, the largest two trading partners of recent periods. Export and import activity with Saudi Arabia is quite well balanced; in addition, it is mentioned that Saudi Arabia's imports from Turkey show a consistent increase.

So the question remains why, at a time when world oil prices have dropped and oil exporting Middle East countries have difficulty finding buyers, we still buy oil in the amount of almost 1 billion dollars from Libya even though Libya has severely cut back imports from us.

Experts as well exporters propose that the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Commerce conduct joint studies, and that, instead of buying oil from Libya, we should deal with nations which want to buy from us and which have the potential buying power, such as Algeria, Egypt, or Nigeria.

For instance, it has been said that Nigeria is very anxious to buy from us but does not have cash, and that we could sell to Nigeria in return for oil, goods initially amounting to \$100 million--a sum which could easily mount over the years. We are also reminded that our trade with Algeria in recent years developed to the detriment of Algeria. Attention is drawn to the fact that although exports to Algeria increased from \$31 million in 1981 to \$125 million in 1982, our imports from this country fell from \$34 million in 1981 to \$9 million last year. Only after Algerian officials warned of import cut-offs, did we decide about two months ago to buy from them \$90 million in oil.

Reminding that our two big customers, Iran and Iraq, do not seem to be much inclined towards buying this year, exporters insist that the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources roll up its sleeves and start to collaborate closely with the Ministry of Commerce to establish lasting bilateral commercial ties based on balanced import-export and mutual interest.

12203

CSO: 3554/284

INTEGRATION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL REGULATIONS URGED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 9 May 83 p 1

[Text 7] Ankara--There are calls for reorganizing the Foreign Capital Bureau which functions under the State Planning Organization, and making it into the sole responsible authority. For this purpose, it is suggested that while both the Foreign Capital Bureau and the Foreign Capital Coordinating Association conduct preliminary preparations, pertinent measures and regulations should be integrated, the regulations regarding the scope added to laws currently in effect reshaping these laws.

At the current stage of studies, a rough draft has been formulated by the Foreign Capital Coordinating Association. It says that although article 6224 of the law was prepared under a "liberal" understanding, the interpretation in actual practice has been "hard" for a long time, adding:

"Especially the conviction in the 1st clause of the law that initiative is beneficial to the country's economic development. To various people, interpreting this in a narrow and hard sense, this has become the reason, as it were, not to grant permits to applications regarding investments, extensions, capital increase, profit taking and transfer, as well as modernization, replacement and maintenance of the simplest machinery. The equal treatment tenet of the 10th clause in the law 6224 is very forced, and has been knowingly evaded. For instance, in spite of this tenet, tax laws provide different tax rates for foreign partners. Foreign partners are not to benefit from exemptions and exceptions; rules to this effect are currently on the books."

The draft statement notes that it is of "great importance" to foreign capital to maintain consistently those rules and regulations it encountered when first entering the country. Included further is the view:

"In this regard, it is of utmost importance that the foundations of both the foreign capital scope regulations and Foreign Capital Bureau be legally guaranteed, in other words, formulated into law, and incorporated into law 6224."

The statement points out that initial efforts along these lines have not yet led to any results, noting that the draft prepared by the association is geared towards providing integrated measures, but that it also aims to liberalize those points relating to equal treatment, freedom of work, and area of activity.

The Foreign Capital Coordinating Association is in the midst of being reorganized. And while it is desirable that the Foreign Capital Bureau be made into the sole responsible authority in this field, it should also be brought directly under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Prime Minister after the bureau's reorganization.

As the foreign capital measures are given new form and content, it is urged that clauses in law 6224 and in the scope regulations which are unfair to Turkish and foreign partners, be amended, and a legal base provided which is conducive to new incentives. It is pointed out that the "equal treatment" tenet in existing regulations usually translates to "unequal" for foreign partners. It is further suggested that each process not be subject to permits.

The draft further expresses the view that investments to be made in Turkey by institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank, IFO / International Finance Corporation ? 7 and the like, and investments by Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar which generate export potential into these and other Middle East countries, should not be subject to authorization by the Cabinet. In addition, it is also suggested that the authorizing agency for investments in the tourism industry in operations of 200 plus bed capacity and those blocking 40% of capacity for foreign tourist use, as well as those promoting tourism by yacht, should be the Foreign Capital Bureau.

12203

CSO: 3554/284

DEFINITION OF POLITICAL STATUS KEY TO CYPRUS ACCORD

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 9 May 83 p 8

[Article by Haluk Ulman: "Cyprus Back on the Agenda"]

[Text] The UN General Assembly resumes its 1982 sessions tomorrow. In all probability, the sessions will continue for four days and then adjourn. These final sessions are important to us because the Greek Cypriots backed by Greece and the vast majority of nonaligned nations will be putting the Cyprus question back on the agenda.

Ever since 1974, the Cyprus question has been known to be one of the diehard issues of UNGA sessions. It has not come up on the agenda for a number of years. More precisely, it has been an agenda item, but simply has not been discussed because results were expected to come of the talks being held between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities under UN auspices. These talks have been going on for a long time, however, and nothing has come of them owing to tremendous differences of opinion between the two sides. Using this as an excuse, the Greek Cypriots (and Greeks) now hope to hide behind the apron strings of the UN majority once again in order to force Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to accept their demands.

The Turkish side wants to see the establishment of a bizonal, bi-communal federation on Cyprus based on the equal sovereignty of the two communities. Turkey has no intention of withdrawing its forces from the island until this solution is reached. Any action to the contrary would mean leaving the Turkish Cypriots at the mercy of the Greek Cypriots once again. Greece and the Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, hope to re-establish the supremacy of the Greek Cypriots on the island under the guise of a federation. In order to be able to make the Turkish Cypriots accept this, they want to have the Turkish forces withdrawn from the island as soon as possible. They know that if the Turkish troops are withdrawn, the Turkish Cypriots will have lost their biggest trump card for resistance and their bargaining power will have been destroyed.

The resolutions adopted so far by the UNGA would have to be very satisfactory to the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, because all of these resolutions begin by calling for 'immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from the island'--which implies Turkish forces too. The resolutions also call for the return of refugees to their homelands. Each year the wording gets a bit harsher, as the Security Council is charged with the task of taking the necessary steps to implement the UNGA resolutions.

Chances are that the same thing will happen again this year, and after a bit of haggling, the same sort of resolution will be adopted.

And then what? As I explained above, Turkey is not about to withdraw its troops from Cyprus simply because it is called upon to do so by the UNGA. Withdrawal of the Turkish forces is contingent upon definition of the political status of the island. It can only be done after the political status is defined. On the other hand, the UN call for the return of refugees to their homelands is quite a different matter. If we were to agree to this, we would be demonstrating our good intentions and giving the Greek side an opportunity to prove how sincere it has been in the intercommunal talks.

Indeed, the Greek Cypriots have been very good at disguising their intentions. They have been telling the world that the intercommunal talks have failed to progress because of the uncompromising attitude of the Turks. In so doing, they have been blaming us for their own faults. To spoil this little game of theirs and let everyone see who the real culprit is, our side could show its good intentions by opening a limited section of Varosia for the return of refugees. Provided that the talks progress and the Greek Cypriots accept the Turkish demands, we could then expand this section.

If the Greek Cypriots truly desire an agreement, they can find no better opportunity than this for approaching talks constructively. If they continue to be adamant despite this, then they will be showing the whole world that their intention is to waste time--not to reach an agreement.

Turkey should give some thought to the possibility of trying out this peaceful approach and calling upon the Greek Cypriots to reciprocate.

12279

CSO: 3554/289

FRENCH BOOK REVEALS TIES BETWEEN DANISH CP, GDR SPYING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 May 83 p 3

[Article by Mogens Auning]

[Text] A revelation in a book that has just appeared in Paris has brought in a whole new perspective on the matter of the theft of a fortune of over a half million kroner, which four young fellows stole in March 1982 from a safe belonging to Ingmar Wagner, who had just been reelected to the DCP's Central Committee.

The author, Jean-Francois Revel, writes that a part of the 150,000 Deutsche marks stolen from Wagner was ransom money paid by the West German government in the fall of 1981. BERLINGSKE's correspondent in Paris, Jorgen Schleimann, discusses Revel's book on page four of this section.

A source within the Danish security authorities confirmed to BERLINGSKE that as early as during the investigation of the theft in 1982 it was known that the many Deutsche marks were in part ransom money.

In November 1981 the West German government concluded a "human trade" with East Germany. A group of Eastern spies in prison in the West was released in exchange for 70 East Germans being allowed to come to West Germany.

Among the spies who were "traded" was the East German, Joerg Meyer, who in 1980 was sentenced to six years in prison by the Supreme Court in Copenhagen for espionage against the Danish government. Among other things, Meyer worked with a female agent employed in the economic section of the Foreign Office.

On 26 November 1981 Meyer left the Nyborg state penitentiary and was taken to the border by the Danish police and transferred to the West German authorities. A short time afterwards, he was in the GDR.

But together with him and the other Eastern spies that were sent home, the Germans delivered a large amount -- the exact amount was kept secret -- in new 500 and 1,000 Deutsche mark bills. The West Germans had recorded the numbers on the bills.

When the police, after arresting a young man in Christiania, found 36,000 Deutsche marks in a box in Hovedbandgarden, where there were also some papers belonging to Ingmar Wagner, the case began to unravel. An inquiry from the Danish authorities to the West Germans produced the result that the Deutsche marks found were a part of the ransom money from the "human trade."

Ingmar Wagner, who was in Moscow when the money was stolen from a box in the country town in Praesto, explained that the money had been collected in Western Europe and that it was to be used in "international solidarity work."

9124

CSO: 3613/117

COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS REELECTS LEADERSHIP, ADJOURNS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 May 83 p 6

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen]

[Text] The leader of Denmark's Communist Party, Jorgen Jensen, would gladly urge a general strike today if it could overthrow the Schlueter government. But he thinks that a year will go by before the time is ripe to overthrow Schlueter.

The Danish Communist Party ended its 27th congress yesterday, and the leader pointed out that now it is more timely and pressing to stop Schlueter, because he is going rapidly forward in popularity among the people.

"We will not go into a waiting position and think that he will unmask himself. That is dangerous. On the contrary, we will go on the offensive," Jensen said.

Jensen thinks that the party, its policy, and the party's leadership are stronger after the congress. Not one thing was changed in the policy.

"No one has criticized the values of the party program. When individual comrades have criticized what we have done, it is to find out how we can do things better."

The Danish Communist Party will continue its present course with the main emphasis on peace work and unity in the working class.

"As long as there is one single cannon in the world, there is danger that it can be used. We are not a party in which debate is carried out for the sake of debate. We shall act and create unity in peace work in the left wing," Jensen said.

On the last day of the congress, the results of the election to the Central Committee -- the party's leading organ -- were made public. At the same time, the Central Committee was expanded from 49 to 51 members.

Of the 51 persons the party leadership had nominated, 50 were elected. Nine new members were elected to the committee

The most remarkable thing was certainly that the European parliamentarian for the People's Movement Against the EEC, Jens Peter Bonde, was elected with 432 of a possible 451 votes. It is normal practice in the DCP for candidates for the Central Committee to have been elected as candidate members. Jens Peter Bonde was not.

The former environmental chief in Copenhagen, Ivan Hansen, was not reelected. He lacked 25 votes. In his place, the teacher Ole Hjort of Svendborg was elected.

The DCP's Chairman, Jorgen Jensen, did not receive as many votes as two of the party's top union leaders, namely Jan Andersen, Head of Metals Section 13, and Dan Lundrup, Head of the Copenhagen Typographers. The party's peace secretary, Anker Schjerner, also received more votes than the leader.

9124

CSO: 3613/117

POLLS SHOW SCHLUTER GOVERNMENT CONTINUING TO MAKE GAINS

Most Popular Government Since World War

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Apr 83 p 1

[Article by Asger Schultz: "Most Popular Government since the War"]

[Text] It is obviously possible to please the voters by demanding sacrifices from them instead of doing the opposite. Even though in the opinion of many the government ought to engage in an even tighter economic policy, it is nevertheless plain that the economic policy the government presented in October has made the present non-socialist government in the eyes of the electorate the most popular we have had since World War II. This is shown by a poll taken by the Gallup Institute.

At intervals of 6 months--except when special events make them relevant--the Gallup Institute undertakes polls of the electorate's assessments of the government in power.

In these polls a representative sector of the electorate is asked the question:

"In your opinion, has the present government done well, reasonably well or not well during the period it has been in office?"

As a rule, the first poll is taken about 3 months after the new government has taken office. The first poll of the "four-leaf-clover" government was taken early in December.

Even though the bourgeois government is not an experiment, its work and its fate hold so much interest that the Institute decided to measure its popularity at intervals of 3 months.

The following table shows the result of the last poll, taken in March, and, for comparison shows the results for March of 1974, 1978, 1980 and 1983:

	<u>Well percent</u>	<u>Reasonably Well percent</u>	<u>Not Well percent</u>	<u>Don't know percent</u>	<u>Total percent</u>
March 1974	9	38	37	16	100
March 1978	17	47	27	9	100
March 1980	6	36	51	7	100
March 1983	38	39	15	8	100

As is apparent, the government has improved its standing considerably since the March 1974 poll was taken. The best category "well" increased from 9 percent to 39 percent, and the worst category "not well" decreased from 37 percent to 15 percent. The bourgeois government started on a relatively high level [in a poll not shown in above table] but has nevertheless been able to improve its position significantly.

The table shows that the present government's position is better than that of any government we have had since April 1968 [April 1968 not shown in table].

The institute has taken the measure of all governments all the way back to World War II, however, and if one compares the latest poll with all the polls taken since 1945 it is apparent that no previous poll has shown so high a score. The present government is thus the most popular we have had in 40 years.

The table below shows responses from the latest poll, distributed according to political preference:

	<u>Well percent</u>	<u>Reasonable Well percent</u>	<u>Not Well percent</u>	<u>Don't Know percent</u>	<u>Total percent</u>
Totals	38	39	15	8	100
To the right of the Social Democrats	70	28	2	-	100
Social Democrats	17	49	24	10	100
To the left of the Social Democrats	15	38	43	4	100

As is apparent, two-thirds of the Social Democratic voters think the government has "done well" or "reasonably well", and more than half of left-oriented voters share that viewpoint.

Among the opposition's voters the non-socialist government has also made an impression.

Only 15 Percent Negative

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Apr 83 p 8

[Article by Dan Axel: "Government Reaches Top in Popularity]

[Text] "The four-leaf-clover" government has come to stay. Optimism and the people's understanding of the government's work of clearing away and rebuilding will continue during the next election period."

So says Prime Minister Poul Schluter, who--according to a Gallup poll published in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE today--heads the most popular government we have had since World War II. Thirty-eight percent of those polled think the government has done well, and 39 percent say reasonably well. Only 15 percent say "not well" concerning government policy.

"This is encouraging, and what can contribute to a further strengthening of optimism is that we perceive a broad and growing understanding among almost the entire populace," said Poul Schluter on Saturday, when the Central Committee of the Conservative People's Party met at Christiansborg. The prime minister stressed, however, that the government is a minority government, forced to cooperate with other parties.

"And there are some savings proposals that have fallen off in a sharp curve. We have also sometimes had to swallow some camels in the sense that a majority passed things the government did not want passed," said Poul Schluter. "This applies particularly to foreign and security policies. But let there be no doubt that there are limits to how far the government will go in accepting such situations."

In the opinion of Knud Heinesen, political chairman of the Social Democrats, Poul Schluter takes to "incorrect party-political agitation" when he takes all the credit for the positive economic development.

"This is false advertising," says Knud Heinesen. "The good news has gone to the prime minister's head. The government's self-praise is growing so rapidly that we are now only waiting for the prime minister to claim credit for spring having come."

According to the new Gallup poll, two-thirds of Social Democrats think the government has done well or reasonably well.

Paper Comments on Poll Meaning

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Apr 83 p 10

[Editorial: "Highest Praise"]

[Text] Let us hope it does not go to their heads. In the Sunday BERLINGSKE TIDENDE the Gallup poll shows that this government receives the greatest praise any government has had since the 1945 liberation. Can the ministers stand

reading this without becoming too cocky? Do you believe that each one of them is so ingenious, so faultless in every respect, that the wave of popularity will carry them through all difficulties? This they must not let themselves be led to believe. Let them rejoice this Sunday, but let them not think they are so much better than many others who have borne the responsibility for the country during the past 4 decades.

It is undeniably noteworthy, however, that the four-party government is doing so well that even most Social Democrats admit it. No Social Democratic prime minister--Hans Hedtoft, H C Hasen, Viggo Kampmann or J O Krag, not to mention Anker Jorgensen--has found himself in a situation where the people showed wide confidence in the government. Nor has any non-Social Democratic prime minister experienced it--neither Knud Kristensen, Erik Eriksen, Hilmar Baunsgaard nor Poul Hartling. It is a government headed by the first conservative prime minister of this century that has gained this popular recognition.

Poul Schluter has proved to be an excellent leader of the government, with the ability to effectuate cooperation among the four parties. Some government members are better than others, but none of them is unsuited to his position. The government has not always acted equally wisely, and it has had its misfortunes. A boil which if not punctured could endanger its life is its lack of strength to make the Social Democrats stick firmly to security policies. Its success is due to its firm willingness to tackle economic problems with a firm hand. And it is due--as the government will itself admit--to the fact that international developments have made it easier for it to see the results of the policies it carries out. These are results that need not be explained, they are visible and tangible.

It is startling that a government can obtain such popular backing against the background of a social crisis, far from resolved and the effects of which will be felt for a number of years. Foreign debt and unemployment, budget reductions and readjustments will continue to be great problems to the government, and its daily life will not become easier. It is government without a majority in the Folketing, which from hour to hour must obtain agreement by others. But Poul Schluter's government is strong, because there is broad understanding of its task, because it got off to a good start and because it has gained so broad support from the people.

Liberal Party Gains in Other Poll

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 1 May 83 p 8

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard: "More Votes for Liberals"]

[Text] For the first time since the December 1981 election the Liberal Party is gaining voter support, and the party now has support that exceeds that of the election result. This is shown by the latest political poll, which gives the Liberals a gain of two seats [in the Folketing] and the Conservative Party a gain of 21 seats.

On the other hand, the other two government parties did not fare so well. The Christian People's Party finds, after its just-concluded congress, that the voters remove it from the Folketing, while the Center Democrats lose seven seats.

It is also noteworthy that even though the Progress Party finds much less favor among the voters than it did in the election, the party shows a gain of 2 percent since the March Gallup poll. The latest poll was taken during the 14-24 April period, at a time when there was great internal unrest in the Progress Party because of Mogens Glistrup's declaration to the effect that the majority of the Folketing group and its present leadership had abandoned Progress Party ideas.

<u>Seats</u>	<u>Today</u>	<u>Gallup</u>
Social Democrats	59	58
Radical Liberals	9	6
Conservatives	26	47
Socialist People's Party	21	18
Center Democrats	15	8
Christian People's Party	4	0
Liberals	20	22
Left Socialist Party	5	5
Progress Party	15	11
No party affiliation	1	0

Political Index

Polling period:
14-24 April 1983

Question: For which party would you vote if
Folketing elections were held
tomorrow?

	<u>8 Dec</u> <u>1981</u> <u>percent</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1983</u> <u>percent</u>	<u>March</u> <u>1983</u> <u>percent</u>	<u>April</u> <u>1983</u> <u>percent</u>
Social Democratic	32.9	32.5	32.1	32.2
Radical Liberal Party	5.1	3.3	3.9	3.5
Conservative Party	14.5	24.0	27.4	25.9
Justice Party	1.4	-	-	-
Socialist People's Party	11.3	11.4	9.8	9.8
International Socialist Workers Party	0.1	-	-	-
Communists	1.1	-	-	-
Center Democrats	8.3	5.1	5.4	4.4
Christian People's Party	2.3	-	2.3	-
Workers Party KAP (Communist)	0.1	-	-	-
Liberal Party	11.3	10.5	10.0	12.2
Left Socialist Party	2.7	-	2.7	2.7
Progress Party	8.9	7.0	4.0	6.0
Other Parties*	-	6.2	2.4	3.3
Totals	100	100	100	100

*Parties with less than 2 percent of the votes.

11,256

CS0: 3613/109

MOTZFELDT ADOPTS MODERATE LINE IN GESTURE TO ATTASSUT PARTY

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 7-8 May 83 p 4

[Text] Siumut and Atassut Bury the Hatchet

The Chairman of the Greenland party, Siumut, Jonathan Motzfeldt, who was re-elected Tuesday as Prime Minister at the head of a Siumut minority government with support from the little left wing party, Inuit Ataqutigiit (IA), offered his hand Thursday to the large opposition party, Atassut, which had encouraged Motzfeldt to "bury the hatchet" from the election campaign.

Cannot Afford Disunity

"We cannot afford disunity. There are many large national problems that must be solved. They are in areas such as unemployment, housing shortage, and alcohol problems," Motzfeldt said.

"We must make an effort to listen to the other parties' points of view, and they will be consulted in important decisions," the Prime Minister said.

At the same time, Motzfeldt criticized tendencies to split the population into Danish speaking and Greenland speaking: "Together we must suppress this bad development that has come forth particularly in the months before the election. In the midst of our search for a constructive, positive, and reasonable development and coexistence between groups of peoples, we must be aware that there are also destructive forces that want to poison our environment so much that we will create even more unnecessary problems in the Greenland community," Motzfeldt said.

Alcohol

"The solution is honesty toward one another. Lies and deceit are classic examples of how one can destroy the relationship between two peoples," Motzfeldt said with clear reference to the anonymously edited publication, GRONLAND DANSK, which during the campaign received attention with claims that Motzfeldt, among other things, had been sent to the hospital to be pumped out after an election meeting.

Motzfeldt devoted a part of his speech to the alchohol problem that has grown a lot since the elimination of rationing. The sale of beer alone has increased by 71 percent. "The government must cooperate with workplaces, with the schools, and with youth organizations to create a new attitude toward alchohol."

9124

CSO: 3613/116

ACTIVITIES OF TURKISH EXTREME RIGHTIST GROUPS

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 18 May 83 pl4

[Article by Von Juergen: "A Turkish Invitation to the Dance. Rightwing Radical Groups Propagandize With Culture: No Response From German Authorities"]

[Text] "In light of recent trends within German rightwing extremism, I'm not at all surprised." This was the reaction of Juergen Mechelhoff, editor-in-chief of METALL, the house organ of the metalworkers union, IG Metall, to the latest developments among rightwing Turkish extremists in the Federal Republic. Mechelhoff felt obliged to characterize the rapid growth of Turkish rightist extremism and the impotence of any official German response to their activities because METALL in the past had reported in depth on the criminal activities of the rightwing fanatics--in vain, as it would appear today.

On 30 April the "Federal Youth Conference" of the extreme rightwing "Turkish Federation" took place in Solingen, the fourth of its kind in this year alone. It encountered no opposition. The municipal authorities simply declared that they did not know who the 700 radical rightist Turks were, who were meeting there. Two weeks earlier they had met at Hattingen. There the city government had even allowed them the use of the high school auditorium. The event was touted, like all other political rallies of the rightwing Turkish extremists, as a "dance and cultural event." Here too, the response of the Hattingen municipal authorities was remarkable. "Owing to language difficulties, the city and the police received no objective report whether and to what degree this was a rightist political meeting."

Much the same response came from Darmstadt's mayor, Guenter Metzger. There, on 27 March, city-owned facilities were also made available to the rightist Turkish radicals. While it could be claimed at the first meeting of the Turkish rightists in Darmstadt that nothing was known about the background of the event and its sponsors, this could certainly not be asserted later. The German Trade Union Federation in particular had pointed out that behind the "cultural association" was concealed the organization known as the "Grey Wolves." Nonetheless, municipal facilities were once again on 27 March made available to the rightist fanatics, "because there were no legal grounds for barring the organization."

One of the main speakers at Darmstadt was Ali Batman, then the deputy chairman of the "Turkish Federation," the European confederation of rightwing Turkish radicals. He stated openly that "there is a majority support within our organization for the MHP. The policies of the Turkish Federation are, of course, determined by that fact." MHP was the extreme rightwing "Party of the National Movement" which was accused even by the generals in Ankara of sharing responsibility for the reign of terror in Turkey which led to the military takeover. MHP chief Alparslan Tuerkes is the only political party leader still being held in prison even though he has sent imploring letters to the generals. "We both have the same goals and ideals. Why are you persecuting us?" The generals were successful in forestalling a second putsch which Tuerkes had been planning.

Although the MPH is no longer active in Turkey, it continues to operate elsewhere in Europe. Serdar Celebi is the chairman of the "Turkish Federation." This spring the Federal government extradited him to Italy at the request of judicial authorities in Rome. They had charged him with having been actively involved in plans for the assassination of the Pope. What is remarkable in this connection is that all those Turks in Europe connected with the Papal assassination attempt were from the rightwing Turkish political scene.

This does not change the fact, however, that German authorities have so far acted with extreme restraint in dealing with the Turkish rightwing radicals. One example of this is Serdar Celebi. In November 1981, the then minister of the interior for Hesse, Ekkehard Gries, stated that "Celebi's violations of local registration and visa regulations would be sufficient to reject his application for an extension of his visa and, if necessary, to justify other steps to end his residence in this country."

At the same time Gries declared to Gert Luetgert, SPD deputy to the Land legislature, that the district president in Darmstadt "had been requested to prohibit the political activity, both written and oral, of this foreigner." The strange thing was that Celebi was not informed by the authorities of this move, nor did he abide by it. When asked by Luetgert why no action had been taken against Celebi, the minister of the interior replied laconically that "We haven't been able to find Celebi." He was only later taken into custody by Italian police.

Neither is the deputy chairman, Ali Batman, altogether an unknown quantity. Early this year he filed a petition for political asylum after having been deprived of his Turkish citizenship on 10 September 1982. Batman admits to having been chairman of the "Idealists" in Turkey in 1976. This was a rightwing extremist organization which was outlawed in 1978 by the then prime minister, Bulent Ecevit. "Because of the terrorist activities of this rightwing extremist group," according to Ecevit.

In the meantime, according to Batman, he has become a "victim of political persecution" because of his having reported in the bulletin of the Turkish Federation, VATAN HASRET, on the "torture methods practised on his political associates." Another dangerous agitator of the Turkish rightwing extremists

living undisturbed in the Federal Republic, is Enver Altayli. In 1976 he set up the MHP overseas organization; later, in Turkey, he became editor-in-chief of the MHP journal HERGUEN and in charge of public relations for Tuerkes and his MHP. In Turkey he is now, like Batman, on the police wanted list.

In contrast to their earlier activity, the Turkish rightwing extremists are not at present violent. They go about their business quietly and with great skill. While leftwing Turkish groups are constantly breaking up into factions and losing their members in droves, the rightists have been successful in mobilizing previously apolitical Turks. These are displaced and insecure young people and adults. Social isolation, xenophobia and economic uncertainty affect the lives of young people in particular. The rightwing extremists offer them the feeling of being taken seriously by pointing to a glorious Turkish history in which Turkey once played the role of a world power. The nationalist self-confidence conveyed by all this is their compensation for the humiliations endured in West Germany.

Thus the "Turkish Federation" and its affiliated "cultural associations" have evolved into "the most important anti-communist Turkish workers organization" as they were recently lauded by the staunchly conservative Wurzburg DEUTSCHE TAGESPOST. Also profitable for the rightwing salvationists is another generally ignored activity: many signs point to their collaboration with the Turkish Mafia in drug and weapons dealing. It is perhaps only a coincidence that one Saral Atalay, resident in Munich, operates a flourishing business in that city in partnership with Bekir Celent, a resident of Sofia. Bekir Celent is regarded by the Italian state attorney's office and by the Turkish press, as represented by the writer Altan Oeymen of the respected daily MILLIYET, as the "boss of the Turkish Mafia."

His business partner Atalay characterizes himself as a "sympathizer of the Grey Wolves" because of their anti-communist posture. Celent, who maintains close relations with the rightwing radical Turks, was able to move freely in Munich and Frankfurt in pursuit of his "business dealings" until being sought internationally in connection with the attempt to assassinate the Pope.

Neither is there a great deal of interest in Bonn for connections such as this which are now the rule rather than the exception. Instead the Federal Ministry of the Interior has expressly stated that there is no such organization as the "Grey Wolves," as did Carl Dietrich Spranger, parliamentary secretary of state in the interior ministry, in March. Yet the fact is that members of the Turkish Federation are fond of styling themselves "Bozkurtlar," i.e. "Grey Wolves." The grey wolf, explains Ali Batman, is a legendary symbol from Turkish history.

There is no denying the fact that the "Grey Wolf" has been used in Turkey since the 1960's exclusively by members of rightwing extremist groups as "their" symbol. The grey wolf, once a revered historical symbol, became the badge of terror: for murders, sabotage, rightwing terrorism. Then and now it has been the members and sympathizers of the MHP and the Turkish Federation who regularly style themselves as the "Grey Wolves."

It is in those Laender governed by the CDU/CSU where the symbolic meaning of the grey wolf has been taken over exclusively by the rightwing extremists, which is in itself remarkable enough. The degree of vigor shown by Bavarian authorities in dealing with the Turkish rightwing extremists can be seen from a memorandum of the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior of 26 February 1981, which was only recently uncovered by METALL. There it states that "the designation in question is not to be repeated in the future, regardless of the review of the arguments brought forward." Earlier, an attorney for the Turkish rightwing extremists had complained that the "Turkish Federation" had been characterized in the 1979 Bavarian Verfassungsschutz report as the "overseas organization of the MHP." The rightist extremists challenged this designation in court and were upheld. In the 1980 Verfassungsschutz report, as in later ones, this designation was dropped.

9878

CSO: 3620/356

MAX JACOBSON SEES TREND TOWARD NORDIC PARTY SPECTRUM

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 22 Apr 83 p 10

[Text] The exchange of messages in the political life which started at the resignation of President Urho Kekkonen is about to end with the cabinet issue, said Max Jacobson, president of the EVA, in Oulu on Thursday.

The parliamentary elections and the government issue mean, according to Mr Jacobson, also the end of the national frontier phase which started in 1966.

"Finland is moving towards the Scandinavian party structure, where the SDP is the major party of the Left and where the communist party is shrinking into a small party," said Mr Jacobson. According to him, the ideological differences are moving towards a new axis.

According to Mr Jacobson, the signs indicating a change in the political life can be seen in the fact that "for the first time after the World War II, the foreign policy is not being used for separating political parties in the cabinet negotiations."

According to Mr Jacobson, this is also the first time for 25 years, when the cabinet negotiations are carried out without Johannes Virolinen or Ahti Karjalainen. For the first time the SKDL's participation in the cabinet has not even been discussed, and for the first time the door to the cabinet has been opened to Mr Vennamo's party.

12190

CSO: 3617/117

STALINIST ORGAN REPORTS JACOBSON'S CP-DECLINE SPEECH

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 26 Apr 83 p 8

[Text] Max Jacobson, president of the EVA [Economic Commission], has hurried ahead of things by rejoicing at the split in the SKP. "The communist party divided into two no longer plays the important role it has had in the union movement for a long time as a factor in the selection of the president and a controller of the foreign policy," said Mr Jacobson in the spring meeting of the chamber of commerce in Oulu.

"The exchange of messages, which started in the political life, when President Urho Kekkonen left his resignation in the fall of 1981, is about to end with the parliamentary elections and with the upcoming cabinet issue," estimated Mr Jacobson.

According to the president of the EVA, this is the first time after the World War II, when "the foreign policy is not being used to separate political parties in the cabinet negotiations."

"For the first time for about 20 years, the SKDL participation in the cabinet is not even discussed. For the first time the door to the cabinet is open for Mr Vennamo's party."

Mr Jacobson considered the SKDL's massive losses in the election as a sign of "a healing of our society."

"Historically it was an important event which shows that the structures in our political life are changing. Communism as a movement tending toward a social revolution has lost its power in Finland," boasted the president of the EVA, and at the same time, he expressed his satisfaction about the declining role of the SKP in our foreign policy.

12190

CSO: 3617/117

BRIEFS

KUOPIO SKDL SOCIALISTS ORGANIZE--A new organization has been founded for the SKDL socialists in Kuopio. The regional organization in question is the eleventh of its kind. The meeting for the foundation of this organization was called upon by the representative Lauha Mannisto. The regional organization stated in its declaration that an internal democracy must be reached within this movement, and that instead of secondary member issues, the issues of the remaining supporters must be taken care of, and theoretical discussions must be left aside. According to the founders, the regional organization will not become an overlapping organization for the basic organizations in the SKDL. [Text] [Helsinki KANSAN UUTISET in Finnish 25 Apr 83 p 6] 12190

CSO: 3617/117

POLL SHOWS LEFT AGAIN LOSING SUPPORT TO CENTER, RIGHT

Oslo VERDENS GANG in Norwegian 7 May 83 p 3

[Article by Per Norvik: "Slow Going for the Labor Party"]

[Text] Things are going very slowly for the Labor Party right now, while the Conservative Party has an impressively strong position with the voters. This is seen in the Norwegian Opinion Institute's April barometer for VERDENS GANG.

The April poll also shows that the distance between the two blocks in Norwegian politics is strongly in the nonsocialist parties' favor. Now the gap between the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party on the one hand, and the Conservative, Christian People's, and Center parties on the other, is a whole seven percent.

Strong Jump

The April barometer was measured in the time between 13 and 26 April. Therefore the stormy national congress of the Christian People's Party should have been registered among the voters. Many will probably find it surprising that precisely the Christian People's Party has taken a strong jump forward in April. The party's support among the voters went from 7.8 percent in March to 9.1 percent in April.

The Labor Party also held its national congress during the time of the opinion poll in April, but the April poll has hardly found any fluctuation among the voters.

Doing Badly

There is no doubt that the Labor Party is doing badly with the voters right now. One must go all the way back to the time before the last Storting election to find such moderate interest in the Labor Party. Support in April of 36.6 percent (a decline of 0.6 percent from March) lies below the election result of 1981. And this is nothing to brag about for a party that is supposed to have so many good cards in its hands in its present oppositional position.

It is hard to imagine another explanation for the Labor Party's weak position than the unrest the party itself has created around its defense policy.

Unbelievable

It is also clear that the Conservative Party's strong position with the voters can be explained by the lack of strength in the opposition. It is almost unbelievable that a minority government that has such great and comprehensive problems can manage to hold its position so well. The Conservative Party now lies well over the election results of 1981 and shows an increase of 0.3 percent from March.

The Center Party is holding its position and has had a stable support of about 6.5 percent in recent months. The Socialist Left, on the contrary, has problems holding its voters. While the party was at about the same level as the Center Party at the turn of the year, support has now declined to under five percent, and the party is now competing to be the first among the small ones.


The Liberal Party is back down again with a support of 3.5 percent, after having been over the four percent border in March. The Red Election Alliance, the Norwegian Communist Party, and the Liberal People's Party are defending their positions as small percentage parties.

POLITISK BAROMETER FRA NOI								
(1)	(2) Storting- valget 1977	(3) Fylkesting- valget 1979	(4) Storting- valget 1981	NOI des.	NOI jan.	NOI feb.	NOI mars	NOI april
DNA	42.3	36.0	37.1	37.5	37.1	37.5	37.2	36.6
SV	4.1	4.4	5.0	6.6	6.7	5.4	5.2	4.8
H	24.8	29.9	31.8	30.5	31.4	31.8	32.3	32.6
Kr.P.	12.4	10.2	8.8	9.2	8.3	8.6	7.8	9.1
SP	8.6	8.6	6.6	6.0	6.2	6.9	6.6	6.7
RV	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.9	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.8
NKP	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.4
DLF	1.4	1.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.8
V	3.2	5.3	3.9	3.4	3.0	3.1	4.2	3.6
FR.P	1.9	2.5	4.5	5.3	5.3	5.4	4.6	4.4
Andre	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.3

Figure 1. Political Barometer from the Norwegian Opinion Institute

Key:

- | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Labor | 2. Storting Election 1977 |
| Socialist Left | 3. Fylkesting Election 1979 |
| Conservative | 4. Storting Election 1981 |
| Christian People's | |
| Center | |
| Red Election Alliance | |
| Communist | |
| Liberal People's | |
| Liberal | |
| Progressive | |
| Other | |



Key:

1. Conservative + Christian People's + Center 48.4
2. Labor + Socialist Left 41.4
3. Labor 36.6
4. Conservative 32.6
5. Fylkesting Election 79
6. Storting Election 81
7. Average 82

9124

CSO: 3639/115

TOP LEADERSHIP OF SMALL NEO-NAZI PARTY NAMED

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 13 May 83 p 9

[Text] The National People's Party was created in 1975 under the name, Norwegian Front. The right extremist, Erik Bluecher, became the party's first leader. After Hans Petter Kyvik injured two persons for life in the First of May Parade in 1979, the party changed its name to the National People's Party.

The party is built up around the district leaders who are distributed throughout the country. They form the party's central leadership. In the periods between meetings of the central leadership, action is directed by a working committee.

Jan Odegard: Leader of the working committee and therefore the party's strongest person. He is employed by Oslo's Streetcar Lines where he works with uniforms.

Bastian Heide: Leader of the Action Committee that is said to have threatened the Sagene School. He is employed in a credit information firm.

Ole Kristian Olsen: District leader from Vestfold. He is also the leader of the National Youth.

Gunnar Krebs: District leader from Bergen. He was suspended from his job in the Post Office because of his racist opinions. The case will be dealt with soon.

Einar Giaever: District leader in northern Norway.

Tor Petter Hadland: Foreign Secretary, now living in Sweden.

Erik Bluecher: Editor in charge of the party organ, NASJONALISTEN.

Bitten Cathrine Lunde: Editor of NASJONALISTEN.

Olav Hoaas: Co-worker in the party organ. Fired as a teacher because of propaganda while teaching.

Claes Lantz and Steve Brady: NASJONALISTEN's foreign correspondents from Sweden and England respectively. Lantz is a notorious antisemite. Brady was formerly a teacher. He has been in jail for his racist stand.

WILLOCH UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO CREATE STRONG COALITION

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 May 83 p 3

[Commentary by Eivind G. Karlsen: "Will Willoch Soon Take the Initiative Himself?"]

[Text] Nonsocialist cooperation is approaching a decisive phase. Innumerable impatient nonsocialist voters from 1981 are already naturally asking themselves: Can we just trust the Conservative Party in the test of strength against the Labor Party in 1985, or will we get an effective, welded-together majority government in time so that it can accomplish even more in solving the country's problems and by doing so also show a common nonsocialist trustworthiness? If the latter is not possible, one risks more than the Labor Party's power wishes possibly being fulfilled. In the worst case, one must forget about the many years of difficult effort to form and strengthen an effective nonsocialist alternative: the governmentally effective Conservative Party will remain standing alone in this role.

The Conservative, Christian People's, and Center parties should really form a majority government the sooner the better, if possible before the elections next fall. The Prime Minister can himself take the initiative; he is the one who has the difficulties, not the party secretary. A successful expansion of the government would in any case immediately "liberate" the Conservative Party from the difficulties of a minority government and create more courage to press forward in the center parties, even before the treatment of the economic plan for 1984. It is there where necessary tightening must be undertaken. The parties that still have the majority in the Storting cannot possibly be served by "postponing" this until the election year of 1985.

There will probably be no political crisis before summer, even if there continue to be waves in the Tyssedal affair. But even if the government is so far sitting fairly securely, it can, in the opinion of observers, not at all be satisfied with the way things stand. And particularly for an ambitious politician such as Kare Willoch, it must be a constant headache that a majority in the Storting is always willing to let public expenditures rise to the danger point, especially when a budget must be negotiated that a government possibly can agree upon. The majority does not feel the responsibility itself if the total of the additions and debits in the public budget become too large. There is a crying need for a responsible government, particularly when the governing Conservative Party -- together, by the way, with the Christian People's and the

and the Center parties --before the 1981 election declared war against inflation as one of its most important tasks. And this must naturally be done in political practice; words and speeches are not enough.

With the inflationary pressure still building up just the same, it is reasonable to believe that the Willoch government does not have much to go on in this respect, and therefore will draw up a balance sheet at the coming treatment of the revised national budget. When it was presented a week ago, Prime Minister Willoch again stressed the necessity of holding down price rises by, among other things, limiting public expenditures. If instead there should be a majority for the demands for a considerably stronger growth in public expenditures and lending, inflation will take a new spurt and a large number of jobs exposed to competition will be lost, the Prime Minister pointed out as he said that expenditures are now rising too rapidly -- and he added that new appropriations must be weighed against savings in other places.

The Conservative government can hardly say more clearly that it will not be forced into conducting a highly inflationary policy with the devastating effects it has for the Norwegian economy, for the struggle against unemployment, particularly in the long run -- and for the party's political credibility.

The problems in the Storting in this completely vital field in economic policy -- where one should of course see something different from the Labor Party's misrule in the 1970's -- show the weakness in the present cooperative arrangement. At the same time, the challenge to the Conservative and the cooperating parties is sparkingly clear: they must take responsibility together and conduct a consistent policy, begin the necessary measures to create new forces for growth through a healthier economy, among which is a tax policy that stimulates investment. The Conservative Party can hardly be threatened into giving this up.

Time is working for a broad, responsible governmental cooperation, now after the national party congresses. The question is whether it will ripen fast enough. The Christian People's Party and the Center Party are standing "at ease" in support in relation to the Storting election and will therefore be badly paid for just being support parties. They obviously need to come into position, to be more actively with things and to stand more positively in the spotlight. In the Christian People's Party, where the national congress demanded a serious parliamentary situation as "entry ticket" to governmental participation, the mood is against this, according to leading party sources, much less than six months ago. The national congress scarcely understood that one cannot first force a cooperative partner to his knees -- and then ask to be allowed to take part in active cooperation. If the party is to become more than an idealistic political "sect" after 1985, it must recognize its opportunity.

This applies also to the Center Party, which, without real future influence, is risking moving more strongly into the role of a one-sided economic party -- with a policy that really comes close to the Liberal and the Socialist Left parties' grazing grounds. And in their "home field" Center Party has little to gain. By attempting things there they will on the contrary lose even more moderate, non-socialist inclined voters. They know well, by the way, that a Center Party with six percent behind it cannot demand full recompense for its policy in governmental

cooperation. In such a case, one would fail to take circumstances into account.

An interesting thing in future political development will be to see how far the Labor Party, the Socialist Left, and the Liberal Party can fall in support; many of course find good reason to put them into the same "block," much more than the previous, so-called "Center Alternative," which is now quite dead. This will naturally depend upon what results the nonsocialist majority can show in the Storting elections in two years.

The politicians' meeting with the voters can also, in an unlucky situation, result in the Progressive Party's coming into a position of holding the balance. What then? The party, which has already curried favor with the Conservative Party, has up to now placed itself beyond all cooperation with the responsible parties. But if the Progressive Party should develop quite differently, something their new strategy in relationship to the governing party might indicate, the result could quickly be to drive its followers right over there.

It can also not be denied that the party stands better than many would have thought possible a few years ago; according to opinion polls, it is just as strong or stronger than the Center Party, the Liberal Party, and the Socialist Left. It could, if this continues, therefore become a power factor "in the balance" between the cooperating parties and the half and whole socialists in the Storting. This is a bleak possibility from every moderate nonsocialist position.

The cooperating parties have therefore vital reason to come together in the first Norwegian majority government since 1971. The Borten government was the last: since then, Norway has only had minority governments, under the leadership respectively of Trygve Bratteli, Lars Korvald, Bratteli, Odvar Nordli, Gro Harlem Brundtland, and Kare Willoch.

The voter majority wanted things different, at any rate in 1981. When will their wish be fulfilled?

9124

CSO:3639/115

GENERAL ESENER INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL STAND

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 May 83 p 7

[Interview with retired army general Ali Fethi Esener by Deniz Som, date and place of interview not given: "Ali Fethi Esener: I Have Chosen Politics to Serve the Public"]

[Text] "Never have I been far from service to the people and nation," retired army general Ali Fethi Esener remarked, and he stated, "It is because of this sentiment of mine that now I have selected politics as the way to fulfill my duties to the public."

Esener said, "At this time, I am at the stage of actively trying to organize a party. I have not yet acquired founder status. After completing our efforts, I will be ready for any task given me by the party leadership."

Esener, before meeting with President Kenan Evren in Ankara, answered our written questions in Istanbul "with the help of a close friend of his." The answers that Esener gave to our questions were as follows:

[Question] In the written statement that you issued when entering the political arena, you stated, "After 44 years of honorable service in the Turkish army, now I have decided to continue my service to the country through politics." What were the determining factors in deciding upon this course?

[Answer] I have never been far from service to my people and nation. It is because of this feeling of mine that now I have chosen politics to perform my service to the public. I would ask that you evaluate the "reasons" in your question within this conceptual framework."

[Question] You said in your announcement, "I will come under the banner unfurled by my friends in the "common cause." What is the meaning of the "common cause"?

[Answer] The "cause" I refer to is the path which will bring happiness to our nation and people. There is nothing mysterious about our beliefs and philosophy.

[Question] At what level in the political party of which you are among the founders, do you think you will take a position? If you are offered party chairmanship would you accept?

[Answer] I believe I need to correct a point in your question. At present I am at the stage of actively trying to organize a party. I have not yet acquired founder status. After our efforts are completed, I will be ready to take on any role the party leadership gives me.

[Question] How do you evaluate the statement Mr. Sunalp made to the public after his meeting with the president?

[Answer] I really do not see myself as the one to answer that question. This is a matter that does not involve me.

[Question] Mr. Cindoruk, with whom you have worked, has said, "A new name is a question mark in politics." What do you think about that? After you retired in 1977, did you take part in any political activity?

[Answer] I cannot be certain of the intent of Mr. Cindoruk's statement. However, as I am a new name in politics, I believe it is impossible for me to explain his remarks as meaning that room will not be made for new names in the party. I did not get involved in politics at all after I retired.

[Question] Can you tell us what were the experiences that most influenced you throughout your lifework?

[Answer] I served in the Turkish army for 44 years. During that time, the thing that most impressed me was the average soldier when he entered the army to perform his patriotic duty, and his mental outlook when he received his discharge papers.

12280

CSO: 3554/287

EVREN MEETS WITH RIGHT, LEFT POLITICAL HOPEFULS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 May 83 pp 1,11

[Text] Ankara--President Kenan Evren met yesterday separately with the right-wing's Husamettin Cindoruk and Ali Fethi Esener, a retired general associated with the party, and Necdet Calp who is forming the leftwing "Populist Party". It was announced that both meetings, each of which lasted for about one hour, took place following an invitation from the president.

Esener did not give the press an explanation and, dodging reporters in Ankara, flew into Istanbul at 8:30 p.m. yesterday.

During this past week, Ali Fethi Esener had announced that he joined the party which Husamettin Cindoruk, a lawyer, intends to form. Esener went up to Cankaya Kiosk yesterday around lunchtime, arriving there at 1:55 p.m. in a white Renault belonging to the presidency and bearing the license plates 06 VE 105. Also seen with him was Hasan Saglam, a retired brigadier general and ex-deputy general secretary to the presidency.

After talks of almost one hour, Esener emerged from the Kiosk with Saglam. Stopping the car briefly, he distributed copies of a prepared statement to the large throng of waiting reporters. The written statement read as follows:

"To the members of the esteemed press corps: on Thursday, May 5, I have received from my president an invitation to visit him today at 2:00 p.m. Statements regarding the meeting is the prerogative of the presidency. Thank you. Ali Fethi Esener."

Esener wanted to leave the Kiosk after distributing the written statement. However, reporters prevented the car from moving by stepping into the way. At the point a reporter opened the front door of the car, entered, and started taking pictures. Although the reporters invited Esener to step out for picture taking, he did not get out of the car.

At this point reporters bombarded Esener with questions. But Esener was very evasive in face of such persistent questioning, and as a result, his only words were:

Question: "Sir, how did your meeting go?"

Answer: (referring to the written statement) "It is written here."

Question: "Will you meet with Mr. Cindoruk?"

Answer: "What for..."

Question: "Will you meet with Turgut Sunalp?"

Answer: "There is nothing to be said now."

Question: "What is the situation?"

Answer: "Everything will come together later."

Question: "Are you going to be working with Sunalp?"

Answer: "Son, you, too, will see what will happen."

During the questioning a great number of reporters were crowding around the car and in the ensuing confusion, a reporter's flash shattered. Indicating that he did want to talk, Esener said to his driver: "Okay, son, we are going." As he was parting from the reporters, Esener said: "Come now, boys, we will be seeing each other again."

After departing from the Kiosk, the car carrying Esener and Saglam went to the Turkish Grand National Assembly intersection via Ataturk Boulevard, and from there turned towards Bahcelievler. A group of reporters trailing Esener found him by the door of the apartment house #1 on the 15th Avenue in Bahcelievler. Esener again refrained from answering reporters who kept up their questioning in the staircase. When the question was put again whether he would see Sunalp, Esener said: "It is too early to say anything now."

In the meantime, Esener ascended to the top floor and rang the bell of the door to apartment #9, with a sign that read "Selcuk Kantarcioglu". The door was opened by Kantarcioglu, a close relative of Esener and current member of the Consultative Assembly. Esener said goodbye to the reporters and entered.

It was reported that Ali Fethi Esener had spent the previous night at the house of Selcuk Kantarcioglu, member of the Consultative Assembly. Yesterday afternoon, after the meeting with President Kenan Evren, Esener rested for a while at Kantarcioglu's apartment, and then left Ankara for Istanbul. Together with Esener, Hasan Saglam, a retired general, also stayed at the Kantarcioglu apartment for a while.

The Chase

While Esener was at the apartment of Consultative Assembly member Kantarcioglu, a private car, a Murat with license plates 34 D 9203, approached the front of the building at 3:45 p.m.

At 4:25 p.m., a private red Murat brought Ali Yilmaz, an ex-representative from Hatay, who entered the apartment where Esener was staying. And at 4:30 p.m., Esener, together with Hasan Saglam and two friends left the apartment and went to the car with the 34 D 9208 /-sic_/ license plates.

Because no information was given regarding planned contacts, members of the press gave chase to the car carrying Esener. When they realized that they were being followed, Esener's car turned into the famous Ciftlik Restaurant in the Ataturk Forestry Farm. There, Ali Fethi Esener, Saglam and their friends drank some coffee. Esener's car left the restaurant at 4:55 p.m. and headed towards the Istanbul road. About 20 km outside of town, Esener's car stopped. Someone

stepped out and said: "Let me explain. The general is flying to Istanbul on the 7:30 flight. We are driving around to fill the time until his flight."

Inspite of these words, the newsmen who still had not found out with whom Esener would be meeting, continued their trailing.

The driver of the private car continuously changed directions in order to "get rid of the chasers ". This chase continued on to the Sihhiye district. Later, at 5:30 p.m., the car stopped in front of the Officers Club. Hasan Saglam left the car and went into the club, while a suitcase was placed into the trunk of the car. The car now headed towards Bakanlik from Sihhiye. Then, Esener's car again made a sharp turn and headed in the opposite direction towards Ulus.

As Esener's car passed Ulus and headed towards Diskapi, the newsmen gave up this almost four hour chase.

Meeting with Calp

After about one hour following Ali Fethi Esener's departure from Cankaya Kiosk, President Evren met with Necdet Calp, ex-counsellor to the Office of the Prime Minister, who is trying to establish a social-democratic populist party.

Necdet Calp, who arrived at 4:10 p.m. in a private car with license plates 06 KS 401 at Cankaya Kiosk, answered reporters as he was leaving at 5:10 p.m.:

To the question as to whether there was a new development, Necdet Calp answered: "No, that is, for the moment, no," adding further that he will continue with his efforts, and that the president wanted to be kept informed.

"Did the president suggest the need to merge the social-democratic base?"

"The president had expressed the need of merging and forming a single party in Erzincan. We believe that this is a valid directive."

As to whether or not he believes that the social-democratic base will unite under the roof of one party, Calp said:

"Different groups addressing the same layer have to unite. We are now in a position to spell out the conditions. So it is possible if we can agree on questions of staff and policies. But, let me state clearly, we will not join, we will not give in. I consider this necessary in order to form a healthy party."

To the question: "Can we take your words to mean a warning?" Necdet Calp answered: "No. I repeat. We will not join, we will not give in."

12203

CSO: 3554/285

RIGHTISTS MOVE TO PUT HOUSE IN ORDER

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 9 May 83 p 7

[Text] ANKARA--A rallying of the right is expected this week. Conjecture has it that ongoing contacts will be concluded and that the right will unite under a single party.

Rightist Husamettin Cindoruk has been in touch with Mehmet Golhan, and the Aydin Yalcin group has held talks with both Cindoruk and Golhan. These contacts among the three groups are being continued by others and are seen as 'signs of a rallying on the right.'

Individuals in contact with these groups say that 'a number of problems will be ironed out this week.' This is how the contacts are being evaluated:

'The atmosphere became troubled because of what happened in Istanbul. There is currently a need for engaging in more organized efforts within the boundaries of the law and acting with greater restraint. Only after the contacts have been completed and full agreement is imminent will the right start thinking in terms of names. Right now, names are of secondary importance. The important thing is to establish a base of deep-seated commitment and bring cohesion to diversified efforts.'

Turgut Sunalp

Turgut Sunalp, who is involved with efforts to establish the right-wing party, proceeded with his work yesterday morning at the Officers' Club in Ankara where he is staying. He then spent the afternoon working at the Blue House.

Retired General Musa Ogun, who works with Sunalp, had a talk late the day before yesterday with Can Ozbay, one of the lawyers for the National Action Party and idealist organizations. Afterwards, Ozbay made the following comments to the CUMHURIYET correspondent:

'My name was given to Sunalp and General Ogun. I telephoned and came to visit the general. I'm a Nationalist. I work within the right wing. I sincerely would like to see all Nationalists come together and achieve national unity. I told General Ogun that I was at his service if there was anything I could do to help. I said that efforts to gather all Turkish nationalists under a single flag were the best thing for the state.'

The CUMHURIYET correspondent also obtained information from General Ogun regarding the meeting. His comment was: 'Ozbay persistently asked to speak with us. He even had others relay his request. I spoke with him as a citizen. I do not think of him as being a person of consequence.'

12279.
CSO:3554/286

TOKER ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL SITUATION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 9 May 83 p 6

[Commentary by Metin Toker in the column "From Metin Toker's Notebook": "The Situation"]

[Text] It is impossible, once arriving at today, to pretend that we never arrived at today. Just as it was not possible to prevent 27 May after arriving at 26 May, there was no chance to prevent 12 September after arriving at 11 September. The trick was not to arrive at 26 May and 11 September. They were the reasons that 27 May and 12 September were greeted by a "national consensus" in Turkey. In the same way, in May 1983, as we have come to May 1983 it is clear that we must comply with its requirements. Naturally, in each of these three settings, the "national need" has been and is to accept the inability to prevent the establishment in Turkey of a western style democratic parliamentary democracy that the Turks and all the world can accept. This is why there was a more than 90 percent approval rate in the constitutional referendum. Turks and their responsible organizations, in all these events were united on this goal. This intent created a worthy goal.

We did not have to find ourselves in this situation today. Turkey's political life could have been set up in a different way. Parliament did not have to be held open only to those who passed through the turnstiles of the political parties; political life in the first transitional period could have been saved from the two-way teetertotter. Then, had we been able to do this, instead of the goal established in 1946, "me instead of you" we could have based a goal on the platform of "my idea instead of his." The transition period could have continued to allow the new democracy to solidify around a president who represented the national consensus. He could have been in the administration of a political organization created for this period by reasonable representatives of every point of view who were united toward this end and which could attract to its ranks a large portion of the referendum's 90 percent approval. Yet this could not be done.

It is impossible to pretend that this never occurred. In Turkey, democracy will again be carried out on the two-way teetertotter. To try to oppose this course at this point is to force other possibilities; however it would do damage to the western democratic parliamentary democracy. The nervousness about this abroad, and more importantly at home, would cause palpitations of the heart. Such an action would deviate from the goal.

To solidify a new democracy around a president who represents the national consensus does not change the goal. This goal, Turkish democracy, is the requirement, the "sine qua non." But to obtain this, what is demanded by today's actual situation is, in the elections, to create a big majority party, on the right or left of center, through political organizations based solely on the voter and regardless of whether other political powers support it or try to block it. If these organizations do not do what is required, then they will be setting themselves up for the fate of 27 May or 12 September. We must not believe that Turks are unaware there are those who have the government do away with their opposition.

If such a situation were to come about, to shut down the opposition is always possible and always in tune with the national consensus.

In that case, why the prejudgment? It has always been demonstrated where the real authority rests. Should doubt about this arise, others become ambitious. But after 12 September, others getting their hopes up will take a long time, a very long time, and in the meanwhile, a healthy democracy will develop.

As long as tranquility, dispassion and realism reign supreme...

What is most desirable is to have a national coalition, within such a big majority party, as was the case in Spain during the transition to democracy, one centered around, preferably, the 12 September prime minister; to have the new era function with the president, as representative of the national consensus, supporting the party, and afterward, to have everyone go about their own business. I do not know, is it the conditions or personal shortcomings that this is not realized? But let me repeat, it is impossible to pretend that this has not occurred.

What is required by today's true conditions is for those who emerge from the elections as the "majority party" regardless of how many votes they get and how many seats they win, to responsibly carry out this goal to the extent that they can. Such a national coalition, linked with a president representing the national consensus, will not only create respect for Turkish democracy abroad but internally, will lead to its flourishing. If the administration, rather than worrying about which parties will emerge from the left or right, or about the origins of those that will appear --to play too much on these roots at this point would be counterproductive-- reminds those who do emerge, reminds them with all the authority it commands, of the great responsibility they have when they come to power, then it will provide a great service for and influence upon the future.

12280

CSO: 3554/287

DOGAN ON CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS; ASSESSES RIGHT

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 May 83 pp 1,7

/~Article by Yalcin Dogan: "Developments on the Right to Determine Political Structure"~7

/~Text_7 Ankara--Who trampled over the provisional articles of the constitution? A list of their names has probably been disclosed on some paper...Who was it that acted in defiance of provisional articles of the Political Parties Law?...A list of their names has probably been recorded somewhere as well...Who, where, said what?...These, too, have probably been compiled in some file...

Yet it appears unlikely that there will be any processing of the mentioned lists any time soon. But, "whenever need for a new warning arises", then--without a new warning--the names on the lists will be processed according to existing laws. This is probably how the most tangible outcome of President Kenan Evren's Cankiri talk will develop further in practice...

Let us leave the wavering on the left alone for a moment and follow developments on the right. Because the nature of the future political structure will be shaped by developments on the right. The shape the right takes will carry the stamp of the future political structure. The future political structure will be shaped by whoever leads the right, and along the lines of these leaders' convictions and actions. Should, for instance, the party which General Turgut Sunalp intends to form take on the leadership of the right, the political structure will acquire a different appearance; should a party based on the old right lead, the future structure would display still another shape...

One of the developments on the right is centered around General Turgut Sunalp. Various questions are put to him daily. Let us also direct some questions to him through Ertan Karasu, the press consultant:

"Sir, a while back you met with Celal Bayar..."

"I can report without any hesitation that our meeting with the with excellency Bayar was very fruitful."

"Will you be meeting with Bayar again?"

"If the opportunity comes up in the future to see him, of course I will appreciate such a meeting. However, I don't think it would be right for me to disturb him again at this time when he is already being worn out by everyone else..."

"You said in a statement following the Cankaya visit 'the president and I are in total agreement'. Is this total agreement to be interpreted as total support?"

"I believe the language of my statement is very clear. Surely you can appreciate that it would be wrong for you to interpret it as you please."

President Evren said the other day in Cankiri: "I am the head of the nation, and can meet with anyone I want to meet." Along the lines of his Cankiri talk, he had another meeting in Ankara yesterday. He received at Cankaya Husamettin Cindoruk and Ali Fethi Esener who a while back joined in the efforts to form a party. And three days ago, a four-member "representative group" from the Consultative Assembly had gone up to Cankaya. It has been confirmed now that Esref Akinci, one of the group of four that day, will henceforth work together with Turgut Sunalp. The connection between the Consultative Assembly and General Sunalp is supplied by one of its members, Hayri Seckin. A while ago Sunalp had gone to the Consultative Assembly and talked with members. And following the conversation, he went to have coffee at General Esref Akinci's house. When Esref Akinci declared that "I find the principles of the Central Party compatible with mine", things began to fall into place. In all likelihood, General Akinci's name will be on Sunalp's list of founders. What's more, there will probably be still other members of the Consultative Assembly transferring to Sunalp's list...

Actually, this week is very conspicuous as far as the right is concerned. Therefore, this week is also of importance as far as determining the future political structure is concerned. Because, as a result of meetings already held and still to be held at the highest level as well as at various other levels, it will be decided how many parties are to emerge on the right. Excluding Turgut Ozal's party, the knot to be solved this week is the following: The party to be formed by Turgut Sunalp is taking shape. However, will others attempting to form a party also be successful in founding a party? If you ask them, "there is no doubt". But, will events really be allowed to develop according to their wishes? ...By the end of the week at the latest, we will have an answer to this question.

12203

CSO: 3554/285

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS CONTINUE CONTACTS

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 May 83 p 7

[Text] ANKARA--Various groups endeavoring to establish a Social Democratic party pursued their efforts yesterday.

Technical committees from the group calling itself the 'Social Democratic Force' (SDF) worked on the group's platform and bylaws. Today some bilateral contacts were made between the SDF and the Group of Nine, who refer to themselves as the founders of the Social Democratic Party of Turkey. The contacts were aimed at joining efforts.

Recal Kocaman, a representative from the group working to establish the Social Democratic Party of Turkey, explained that his group is promoting relations not only with those segments of the population that should be included in their party, but also with powerful and important Social Democratic representatives. He noted that once this is accomplished and these representatives are won over, the Social Democratic sector will have gained some important personalities. According to Kocaman, these efforts will be pursued day and night until 16 May.

Dr. Caglar Kircak, who is working in Ankara to establish a party of social democratic orientation, commented: "Events have proven to us that it is not advisable to declare the founders of a party prior to 16 May." He continued, "Our goals are: (1) to establish a contemporary, healthy democracy and let it prosper; (2) to establish a contemporary, civilized dialogue between parties and politicians." Adding that efforts are underway to eliminate the formation of so many different groups in the social democratic sector, Dr. Kircak said that he would be making some contacts this week in Izmir and Istanbul for this purpose.

Vehap Guvenç, Feridun Sakir Ogunc and Mustafa Alpundar have reportedly spoken with Dr. Kircak and they are preparing to bring

former Social Democratic Union leaders together and make a 'declaration.' Moreover, former Minister of Energy, Ihsan Topaloglu, is allegedly among those who have been in touch with Dr. Kircak, and there is also information to the effect that the Kircak team includes Professor Vural Sozen and Dr. Enver Ozer from the university sector. Kircak has likewise been maintaining contact with Sinasi Colakoglu, Kemal Onder and Mehmet Ergil.

Dr. Kircak, stating that he will be continuing his contacts with the Social Democratic sector, went on to say, "We are holding talks at a variety of different levels and are getting positive results."

12279
CSO: 3534/289

EQUIPMENT, USE OF NEW 122 FRIGATE DESCRIBED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German May 83 pp 30-40

[Article by Hannsjoerg Kowark: "The New 122 Frigate. One Year After Commissioning."]

[Text] After the commissionings of the BREMEN on 7 May 1982 and the NIEDERSACHSEN on 15 October 1982--the RHEINLAND PFALZ and EMDEN will follow in the course of the year 1983--an inventory of the frigate program shall be made within the framework of this article. The author, Dr Hannsjoerg Kowark, had the opportunity to spend several days on the NIEDERSACHSEN in February 1983, which in the course of this year's first exercise of the standard combat training unit of the fleet (SEF 1/1983) made a number of trial runs. The author would like to take this opportunity to thank the commander of the 4th Frigate Squadron, Captain (Navy) Lauer, and the commander of the NIEDERSACHSEN, commander Thomas, for the excellent organization of the visit, as well as the friendly reception aboard.

In accordance with the operative concept of the FRG navy--defense of the entrances to the Baltic Sea, securing of the sea lanes in the North Sea--the frigates of the 122 class, together with the naval forces of the NATO partners, have to fulfill the following tasks:

"Protection of reinforcements and sea transports in the North Sea against attacks by surface and submarine forces, as well as from the air. Defense against surface combat and landing units in the North Sea with the goal of eliminating these before they can attack reinforcements, sea transports and coasts.

Interruption of the sea lanes of the Warsaw Pact between the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic in case the enemy should have succeeded in gaining control over the entrances to the Baltic Sea."

Within the framework of this operative concept, the 122 Frigate has the duty in particular of providing for the local security of the resupply convoys coming from overseas in a national defense emergency, especially against submarines, which fully corresponds to frigates, which are primarily designed for fighting submarines. In so doing, the two WG 13 LYNX onboard helicopters are employed as chief submarine hunting components.

In connection with long-range sea reconnaissance aircraft, the frigates, within the framework of providing for sea area security, have the task of preventing the penetration of enemy submarines into certain sea areas. Sonar contacts are relayed by the reconnaissance airplanes to the frigates, which these pursue further with the aid of the onboard helicopters in order to be able to neutralize enemy submarines quickly.

The frigates are employed further for the fighting of submarine and landing units, in the course of which this frigate type, as a rule, operates in mixed units. For in view of the strong threat from the air, in the North Sea especially, the air defense component of the BREMEN-class, consisting of a SEA-SPARROW 8-cell launcher with a reloading capacity of 8 missiles, is not likely to be sufficient. In order to be able to employ the HARPOON ship-to-ship missiles beyond the radar horizon, the two LYNX take over the objective.

The Ship

Aside from the different sonar domes and another type of steel construction, which is suitable for the harsher sea conditions of the North Sea, the hull of the 122 Frigate corresponds to the Dutch standard frigate. Characteristic of both frigate types is the pronounced bow slope and the anchor mounted far off in front. A further basic difference compared to the Dutch standard frigate are the efforts, in the case of the 122 Frigate, to keep the sound signature as low as possible. In addition to the expensive sound attenuation measures, which will have to be taken up in detail, the weld seam of the hull was ground off, for example. All individual demonstrations for the BREMEN, as well as for the NIEDERSACHSEN, have proved the outstanding sound signature of the ships.

The different final acceptance trials have furthermore produced a good sea-going performance. The rigid stabilizer system keeps the rolling movement of the ship during heavy seas extremely low. To be sure, during heavy seas and also during maximum speed, the maneuver deck below the helicopter landing site is usually under water. The GFK-cover of the 76-millimeter gun, too, has proved to be insufficiently resistant to the onslaught of the seas. During the hurricane-like storms in February of this year, the canon on the BREMEN was heavily damaged. In the future the cover will have to be strengthened.

In spite of the greater weight, all of the superstructures were manufactured from steel, on the one hand in order to avoid problems during fire fighting after the effects of a hit like those incurred by the British during the Falkland War, as well as, on the other hand, also the fractures at the interface of aluminum and steel which occurred on other ships of the FRG navy. For security reasons, on the interior, too, non-flammable or fire-resistant materials were used for wall paneling, carpets and drapes.

The otherwise elegant appearance of the ship hull is negatively affected by the massive hangar, which comes to an end directly with the ship's wall. For this the difficult process of reaching a decision in regard to the choice of

the onboard helicopter was decisive. In the meantime, however, the advantages of the large hangar have become manifest in the servicing of the two LYNX as well. Furthermore, now as before, the hangar offers the possibility of reequipping with a larger helicopter at a later date.

Weapon Systems

The 122 Frigate, which is primarily designed for submarine hunt, has at its disposal, as the main component for the detection and hunt of submarines, 2 WG 13 MK 88 SEA LYNX onboard helicopters. Fully armed, i. e., equipped with 2 torpedoes of the type MK 46 Mod 2 and 500 kilograms of fuel, the helicopters attain a maximum flight time of 72 minutes. The helicopters, furthermore, have at their disposal the D17QS-18 dunking sonar by Bendix, which was especially developed for use in the North Sea. By comparison with other NATO navies, the sonar cable of 300 meters is twice as long, which is obviously necessary for its use in the North Sea.

For security reasons the helicopters are employed with a crew of 3 (pilot, co-pilot, and combat observer). Other navies, which also use the LYNX in an on-board capacity, do without the co-pilot.

In the meantime, all 12 LYNX have been stationed at the Naval Air Group 3 in Nordholz. While the "flight operations" of this new component of the FRG navy, as well as the training of pilots and maintenance personnel--altogether the flying component of a 122 Frigate encompasses about 30 men--is proceeding generally satisfactorily, the infrastructure separation between Nordholz (MFG 3 [Naval Air Group 3]) and Wilhelmshaven (4th Frigate Squadron) creates certain difficulties, in particular for the maintenance personnel. With the exception of the helicopter crews, the latter must, prior to the sailing of the frigates, first be brought by bus to Wilhelmshaven. The two helicopters are, as a rule, "embarked" at sea.

With the DSQS-21 BZ bow sonar by Krupp Atlas, a long-range shallow-water sonar, and 4 torpedo catapults for submarine-hunting torpedoes of the type MK 46 Mod 2, the frigates can also detect and attack submarines independently of the flying component. The torpedo room located behind the hangar was originally conceptualized for 30 torpedoes. Since, however, the room as a whole proved to be too small during the reloading of the torpedo tubes, it is being rebuilt in the case of the first two frigates within the framework of their refit time. While this results in a reduction of the reloading capacity, it makes possible, on the other hand, a more rapid armament of the torpedo tubes.

At the present time, the air defense component consists of a SEA-SPARROW 8-cell launcher, whose reload magazine for 8 additional missiles is located directly in front of the bridge, as well as an OTO Melara 76 millimeter cannon, whose tests produced good results. The SEA SPARROW will be tested at the beginning of June 1983, on the Bremen to begin with, in the course of practice firing in the Mediterranean.

It is envisaged, as part of a joint project with the Dutch and Belgian navy, to procure the RIM-7M-version of the SEA SPARROW in the coming years.

As far as the installation of the two RAM-launchers on the aft corners of the helicopter hangar is concerned, it is estimated to take place in 1985 at the earliest since the RAM-program is to be tested to begin with on the 143A fast patrol boats. Appropriate tests are presently being conducted on the PUMA Guided Missile Fast Patrol Boat (P 6122).

The combat of surface targets takes place primarily through the surface-to-surface missiles of the type HARPOON, as well as secondarily in a supporting capacity, through the 76-millimeter cannon. A HARPOON missile has already been fired successfully on the BREMEN.

Electronic or mechanical stabilization of the weapons and sensors make them relatively independent of bad weather conditions. Even the flight operations are still possible even at inclined positions of 20° because of the harpoon-arrest system. During heavy sea the helicopter immediately upon touching down is locked into a bar grate.

Electronics

In addition to the dunking sonar of the two onboard helicopters, the DSQS 21 BZ bow sonar by Krupp Atlas is the most important sensor for the submarine hunt. As could be learned aboard, the combined active-passive installation, which in any operating mode can automatically track up to three different targets simultaneously, has surpassed all expectations in regard to its capacity, especially also against low-noise submarines. The sonar console is fully integrated into the operations center and not separated by a curtain or wall, as it is on almost all French anti-submarine destroyers and also on the Dutch standard frigate. The target parameters depicted on a viewing screen are automatically compared with the stored threat card index in order to give requisite information about the probability of a "genuine" submarine contact to the anti-submarine officer.

For the defense against enemy torpedoes, the torpedo decoy installation is located on the maneuver deck below the helicopter landing site. What we are talking about here is a towed body which simulates the noise signature of the ship. The signature can be changed from the operations center.

While the integration of the different sensors, such as the air surveillance radar D 17 08 by Signaal, the WM 25 target tracking radar, as well as the STIR fire control system proceeded largely without problems, parts of the FL 1800 S [fire control system] had to be returned to AEG-Telefunken for testing certain changes in the software. The 4 jamming transmitter antennae, as well as the EloUM-antenna, were not yet aboard the BREMEN as well as the NIEDERSACHSEN.

After in September 1982 a HARPOON missile was erroneously fired by the Danish frigate PEDER SKRAM (F 352), which caused large-scale damage in a resort village, the fire control consoles on the BREMEN-class and the Danish frigates were rebuilt. The firing switch, which on the Danish frigate during a test run was wrongly activated, is now secured through a key-operated switch, as can be seen on the NIEDERSACHSEN.

Propelling Machinery

The propelling machinery of the 122 Frigate consists of two 20 V 956 TB 92 diesel engines by MTU for cruising speed, as well as two gas turbines LM 2500 by General Electric for maximum speed (CODOG). The Dutch standard frigate, by contrast, has a pure gas turbine propulsion system (COGOG). For reasons of economy, a decision for the CODOG system was made in the case of the 122 Frigate. In the meantime that decision has proved its worth. By comparison with the LUETJENS, for example, fuel consumption is 25 percent lower. Nevertheless the fuel consumption for one hour of maximum speed costs approximately DM 6,500. The most economical speed is at about 12 knots. While the cruising speed with the diesel engines comes to 18 knots, a maximum speed of over 30 knots can be attained with the turbines. With the use of the latter, the 122 Frigate can be accelerated from 0 to 30 knots in 90 seconds. As far as the radius of action is concerned, it is given as 4,000 nautical miles at 18 knots. At this speed, the general supply autonomy would amount to 21 days. With turbine operation, fuel must be taken on within 21 days. The fresh water plant produces 64 cubic meters of water per day--an output which guarantees an optimal fresh water supply without restrictions ("water times").

As already suggested, the 122 Frigate distinguishes itself as an especially quiet ship. The attempt to minimize the noise signature through noise attenuation measures has proved its worth. In order to reduce the sound radiation into the water, the cruise diesel engines and four generators were placed, in part in a double-elastic fashion, on concrete foundations. In addition, the diesel and gas generators are located in sound capsules. Furthermore, the 122 Frigates have the "Prairie" propeller-air-blow-out system for covering up the cavitation noises. With the aid of a compressor, air is blown through holes in the front and back edges of the propeller blades. The variable pitch propellers manufacture by the Escher Wyss firm are also designed for low-noise operation. Damages developed in the sun and planet gear on the BREMEN, so that prior to the expiration of the shipyard guarantee another 10-hour test run was made on the NIEDERSACHSEN, which produced satisfactory results. In the area of noise insulation are found some of the main differences from the Dutch standard frigate and thus also the advantages of the 122 Frigate.

Environmental Protection

Within the framework of environmental protection, the 122 Frigates are equipped with a sewage treatment and refuse incineration plant. With the aid of the vacuum toilet system, solid faeces are filtered out, dried and transported to the refuse incineration plant. Oil-saturated sewage runs through oil removers. The oil residues are then transported to the refuse incineration plant or stored in used oil containers. Glass and sheet metal are collected in containers until the return to the base.

Accommodation

The 122 Frigate is fully airconditioned through a continuous protective-air-airconditioning system, which, in addition to good air and temperature conditions, also guarantees continuous nuclear, biological and chemical protection.

Within the framework of the action "Man on Board", great efforts were made in the sphere of equipment and living arrangements, which, however, by comparison with the modern French frigates, leave much to be desired.

Positive emphasis should be given to the low occupation number in the rooms: Crew and noncommissioned officers are accommodated in rooms with 4, 6, 9 and 12 berths. The commanding officer and the senior officer in command each have a spacious room with shower and toilet. The officers' rooms though turned out to be much too small. There is only space for one desk and chair, so that only one officer at a time can work in the room, although it is occupied by two officers.

New is the conception to move day rooms and seating facilities primarily into the three mess halls (cafeteria, junior-grade NCO mess-hall, and officer mess-hall) in order to create better rest opportunities for the watch off duty.

Considerable improvements were achieved in the sphere of toilet and wash rooms. The excellent equipment of the medical sphere should also be emphasized.

Summary

Since the BREMEN as model ship has to produce substantially more comprehensive final acceptance trials, the NIEDERSACHSEN will be operationally ready in October of this year as the first unit of the BREMEN class after successful completion of the 5-week "flag officer sea training" in Portland. With respect to the state of training of the crews, both ships are "ready to move" at the present time.

It remains to be noted that the deviations from the Dutch standard frigate, especially as regards the capacity of the bow sonar, the low noise level, and the large hangar, have fully paid.

After the installation of the RAMsystems, it is believed, as was asserted on board, to be possible to defend against missiles with a probability of over 90 percent--which reflects the great confidence of the crew in the capacity of these ships.

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UK SCHOLAR VIEWS LAPLAND DEFENSE IN SUPERPOWERS' CONTEXT

Helsinki KANAVA in Finnish No 3 1983 pp 241-246

[Article by George Maude: "Finnish Dilemma Today: the Defense of Lapland"; passages in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] In 1976 Dr George Maude published his book, "Finnish Dilemma — Neutrality in the Shadow of a Superpower" (Otava), in which he dealt with Finland's defense policy options. In this article Dr Maude examines recently presented impressions of Finland's defense of its northern areas.

General Rogers' interview, which appeared in the columns of the 4 January issue of HELSINGIN SANOMAT, was primarily received in Finland as a challenge. The statements General Rogers made in his HELSINGIN SANOMAT interview, the talk he gave on Swedish television at the same time, his initial refusal to retract his statements about Finland and the more satisfied expression seen on his face in the presence of Timo T.A. Mikkonen shortly thereafter point to the fact that Rogers wanted to deliver a challenge. We may even say that his statements were pretty provocative. The general's provocation has to a certain extent succeeded. Mikkonen's interview shows that the general is now more convinced that the Finns would defend their country against all enemies.

In my opinion, the reaction created in Finland, namely the fact that Rogers' original interview was received as a challenge, was as such a proper reaction. To what extent the response was produced in the proper way is another question.

I regard General Rogers' first interview, conducted by Matti Klemola, as an analysis as well, in which the general put his finger on the sorest spot of Finland's security policy. The heart of the general's interview is a problem that is of general significance to NATO, the Soviet Union and above all Finland, although the nature of the problem has been honestly admitted only in NATO speeches. The problem involves the fate of Lapland, specifically the Northeastern Lapland area, during a possible war.

In connection with the matter, we may also speak of the NATO general's own views on the position of neutral countries and the importance of neutrality in Europe in general. I will discuss these views first.

The Significance of Neutrality for General Rogers

Regardless of the fact that Rogers belittled certain Swedish political efforts in the interview he gave on Swedish television, it may nevertheless be said that Sweden's reputation for neutrality has been well preserved, in the opinion of General Rogers.

In the interview Matti Klemola conducted for HELSINGIN SANOMAT, Rogers spoke almost as favorably in the same breath of both Switzerland and Sweden's neutrality, which he takes it for granted is based on armed neutrality and its realization. Austria's neutrality was not discussed at all.

This omission cannot be of no significance because in principle Austria's policy is also based on armed neutrality. Austria's new theory of national defense has arisen from the idea of allowing the enemy to penetrate deeply into the country so that he can be encircled. In 1979 in Austria major military maneuvers were conducted, specifically on the Amstetten-Sankt Polten line /west/ of Vienna. But according to the maneuver plan, the attacker came from the north geographically and from the east politically. This demonstration of Austria's determination to defend itself — in accordance with the "defense-in-depth" theory — made a positive impression on Swiss military observers. We must remember that Switzerland's defense plan during World War II was also based on inland withdrawal, not on defending all of Swiss territory.

I may be wrong, but I have for other reasons come to the conclusion that Austria's defense policy has simply not reassured NATO. As far as I know, Rogers did not even deign to mention it. It is quite possible that Bruno Kreisky's basic security policy viewpoint, in terms of which a small country's best security policy guarantee is the pursuit of a wise foreign policy, has been a clear enough message for NATO military leaders. In passing, we may mention here the fact that Austrian dissidents who have criticized their own country's defense policy weaknesses have been aware of the fact that the major emphasis in Finland's security policy has also been on foreign, not defense policy.* However, as far as both countries' defense policies are concerned, Austria's armed forces are plagued with a burden Finland's armed forces freed themselves from as early as 1962: Because of Soviet opposition, Austria's armed forces do not get missiles and Austria's new national defense theory is in many respects an attempt to compensate for this shortcoming.

In the opinion of many commentators, Austria is not only neutral, but also a neutralized country.

Under certain circumstances, NATO can endorse different countries' neutrality. What it cannot endorse at all is neutralization. For that reason Rogers has spoken skeptically of the European peace movement, among other things. In my opinion, neutralization is the real target of General Rogers' attack.

* Konrad Ginther: Austria's Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union. (Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe, Ed. by G. Ginsburgs and A. Rubinstein, New York, 1978)

It is, nevertheless, worth our while to examine NATO's and especially General Rogers' attitude toward Europe's neutral countries. Obviously, Sweden's possible participation in NATO during the period that organization was established was regarded as useful. The "pajama pocket speech" written by Urho Kekkonen in 1952 was directed against this potential danger. Afterward, NATO endorsed Sweden's neutrality as being as valid as Switzerland's neutrality. Why does General Rogers have doubts with respect to Finland's neutrality?

The fact that doubt has been cast on Finland's neutrality is in its way an irony of fate, because these past few years Finland's defense policy has really tried to function in accordance with a symmetrical model, which is after all the premise of classical neutrality. When I make this claim, I do not have to rely on those recently produced speeches and cartoons that maintain that Finns have always been ready to fight anyone who attacks them. The defense plan for Lapland offers more reliable proof of this. The plan's practical consequences may be regarded as extending to the shooting down of NATO missiles aimed at Murmansk, while, on the other hand, the plan means that a third of the Finnish Army is stationed as a wedge between the Soviet border and Ruija in Norway, or even between the Soviet border and Norrbotten in Sweden.

Because General Rogers appeared to have failed to note this plan in his first talk, some voices in Finland assumed that the general is some sort of armchair strategist who does not know what he is talking about. "An ancient bit of advice," wrote SUOMENMAA on 6 January, "urges us to forgive those who know not whereof they speak."

While there may be good reason for us to forgive the general, I believe that we would not forgive him because he did not know what he was saying. During the Klemola interview General Rogers spoke intelligently and provoked Finns into later coming up with precisely the answers he wanted to hear.

On the other hand, we should immediately point out that there is no reason to expect a symmetrical defense in itself to impress NATO generals. NATO's entire existence is based on rejection of the neutrality option. It is true that NATO nearly surrounds two traditionally neutral countries with which it at present enjoys good relations despite the fact that at one time NATO tried to swallow one of those nations. At any rate, those neutral nations ideologically sympathize with the West. Is there also reason to doubt, for example, that Sweden would defend itself "in the event that Sweden or NATO via Sweden should become the target of an armed attack by the Soviet Union or another nation allied with it"? Such self-defense would mean that Sweden would be fighting de facto alongside NATO, participating in some sort of isolated war against the same enemy.

General Rogers' position is, of course, based on military necessity. That being the case, among other things, he feels that, if a war should break out in Europe, the Soviet Union would send its troops across Northeastern Finnish Lapland to take NATO objectives situated in Northern Norway. In his original analysis the general clearly felt that it could be in Finland's interests to get out of this situation by coming to a mutual understanding with the Soviet Union. The general, of course, thought that there would be a certain amount

of token resistance by Finland, after which, or allied with it, Soviet troops would march through Lapland.

Such a scenario would simultaneously comply with — although the general does not go that far — minimal neutrality requirements and would be in keeping with the spirit of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact]. The second YYA article dealing with consultation, which goes into effect when it has been determined that a threat of an attack from Germany — read NATO — exists, of course, allows the reader to interpret mutual understanding in various ways.

Presented during the Klemola interview, the scenario General Rogers assumed the Finns would resort to if war should break out is not the worst possible one, considering how sensitive Finland's military situation would be during a war. There might be better scenarios, but implementation of the Lapland defense plan is considerably lessening the chances of invoking alternative scenarios.

Finnish Dilemma

Several years ago I wrote a book that appeared in Finnish with the title, "Finnish Dilemma." A dilemma is a situation in which both options are bad and, according to my theory, in a crisis-conflict situation in Europe the Finns would in the face of such a dilemma be in a difficult position between the West and the Soviet Union. The more Finland leans toward one side, the more it can expect countermeasures from the other side.

In the tough world of international politics dilemmas are not rare for small nations: The Netherlands, which General Rogers also pointed to, is right now suffering from a dilemma. Nevertheless, small nations in general make a clear-cut and decisive security policy choice: They enter into alliances — or rather become members of alliance pacts — with their closest of biggest, neighbors. When these small nations enter into such relations, they do not necessarily experience any dilemmas — quite the contrary, they generally make things easier since they tend to ally themselves with larger nations that are ideologically similar. It is not until later — as has happened with the Netherlands — that the inhabitants of the country may realize what they have gotten themselves into.

The Finns' situation is different. They are in the habit of cautiously viewing the contracting of security policy obligations with major powers. This stems from the fact that Finns have not been able to enter into security policy relations with a superpower to their own liking. They have had to content themselves with Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. For this reason Finns attempt to limit such relations by talking of detached war, separate peace, efforts to stay outside of disputes between superpowers over their interests and specifically neutrality, which, according to Max Jakobson, is one kind of detached war.

These restrictions on security policy relations with major powers produce a number of different kinds of consequences which contradict one another. These restrictions mean, on the one hand, that in bilateral military policy

arrangements — like the YYA — Finns seek out a minimal relation, a policy that is complied with by means of foreign policy actions. These actions include participation in a policy of deescalation, disarmament and detente, sometimes on the basis of their own proposals. From this standpoint, I consider the Finnish dilemma to be the point of departure for a favorable Finnish foreign policy.

On the other hand, the above-mentioned restrictions on bilateral military policy relations are compensated for by gradually increasing Finland's own defense capability. This tendency has its own logic. For example, in the 5 January edition of TURUN SANOMAT, acting in accordance with the opinion recently expressed by the armed forces commander,* Lt Col Juhani Kinnari maintained that the effective use of Finland's armed forces could prevent a nuclear power's troops from using Finnish territory, an act which in itself would noticeably add to the danger that nuclear weapons might be used against Finland. In this sense — according to General Sutela and Lt Col Kinnari — the Finnish Army can lend support to the image of a nuclear-weapon-free Finland, which is the essential role of Finland's security policy contribution.

We may, however, argue that the military and political role factors of Finnish security policy are in conflict with one another: In Finland the country's prime minister backs gradual strengthening of the armed forces and in other countries gradual disarmament.

In my opinion, this is an example of a serious contradiction in Finland's /own/ defense policy. The contradiction stems from the fact that they are trying to resolve the dilemma in two opposing ways. The heart of the problem lies in what the Soviet Union would do to Finland in the event of a European crisis. The problem — and one solution to it — is included in Lt Col Kinnari's statement, among others. His approach is merely a variation of the "defense against aid" described by Nils Orvik — that is, the Verteidigung-gegen-Hilfe** theme — according to which improvement of Finland's armed forces would eliminate the /need/ to allow the Soviets to enter Finnish territory. Because of such scenarios, there is reason for us to take a closer look at how well the basic scenario presented in the YYA corresponds to the reality of today.

Significance of the Military Clauses in the YYA

The 1948 pact is in part an obsolete document, if we are talking about the pact's military scenario. A ground forces attack from the West on Leningrad via Finland is no longer thinkable and — a fact that is just as relevant — there is not much evidence that, in the event hostilities should erupt in Europe, NATO ground forces would attempt to get to the Murmansk area across Finland.

What about movement from the other direction, in other words Soviet ground forces', for example, crossing Northeastern Finland to attack NATO objectives

** Speech delivered on the occasion of the inauguration of the 86th National Defense Course on 22 November 1982. "Sicherheit auf finnisch [Security in Finnish]," Stuttgart, 1972.

located in Northern Norway? According to the wording of the YYA, unless it is ascertained by both sides that a threat of attack from the West ("Germany") exists, there would not even be any reason to consider the presence of Soviet troops on Finnish soil, to say nothing of the possibility that such troops might pass through Finland to some other country. Now if the eventuality of a NATO ground forces attack on the Soviet Union via Finland is highly improbable, does it not follow that the Soviet Union should not be granted the right to transit Finland since the Finns will not admit that a threat of attack from the West exists?

In my book, I stressed the fact that Soviet strategic thinking changed decisively when we entered the early 1960's. This change meant that a defense would be conceived of as an offensive, as a preemptive attack (see, for example, J. Komissarov: "Finland Finds Its Policy," p 150). While admitting to me that Soviet strategy has changed in just this way, Finns familiar with the situation nevertheless point out that a Soviet attack need not take place via Finland at all, rather it could be conducted against NATO objectives located in Northern Norway primarily by means of naval and air operations. Even infantry could land in Norway from the sea. In light of this scenario, the importance of Finland from the standpoint of conventional ground forces operations almost entirely disappears. For safety's sake, the Finnish Army could, however, be stationed on the spot to guarantee the inviolability of Finnish territory.

I do not believe in this scenario. It is more important for General Rogers not to believe in it either. He believes that Soviet troops would like to use the Finnish Lapland area. U.S. "think-tank" studies — I will mention only one, Joh L. Lellenberg's "The North Flank Military Balance" (BDM Corporation, 1979) — stress the fact that there are two motorized infantry divisions in Northwestern Russia one of which is trained for landings and both of which are trained and equipped for snow conditions ("oversnow mobility"). Emphasizing Lapland's vulnerability, Finland's Third Parliamentary Defense Committee report points toward that province's relatively well-developed road network. The infantry is generally regarded as the chief weapon of the country's armed forces and the book before and now still entitled "Finland's Armed Forces" says that "machines that have been brought to the battlefield through technological development have not at present been capable of supplanting infantry fighters." The troops at Sodankylä consist of infantry, now backed by artillery.

This emphasis on the importance of the infantry indicates that national defense is conceived of as a consequence of classical armed neutrality in terms of which — just the opposite of Austria — the entire territory is defended. It is peculiar that they have recently been trying to develop Finnish defense policy in the name of neutrality while, on the other hand, Finnish foreign policy has at the same time considerably reduced its references to neutrality. A defense policy in the name of neutrality is based on symmetry on two levels. On the one hand, Finland can be neutral because presumably neither NATO nor Soviet troops need to go through Finland. But, if either one of these military powers' troops should try to do so, the Finnish Army would combat such attempts.

So far the role of the Finnish armed forces has been treated primarily from the standpoint of ground operations. But Finland's most vulnerable target is evidently the country's air space. In connection with this the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee report stresses the operational value of Finland's neutrality. Operational value for whom? For both parties, by which are meant both NATO and the Soviet Union. According to the report, it will be "to the advantage of both parties... for Finland to be capable of inflicting defeats for violent use of its air space." Therefore, the defense of Finland's neutrality simultaneously would serve both NATO and the Soviet Union" An indirect consequence of this would be the fact that it would also serve Finland's interests.

I would be inclined to see things in another light and to place Finland and its inhabitants' interests foremost. In connection with raising the question, we might consider another kind of defense policy that is not based — as is the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee report's conception of it — on every square meter of Finland, but on defending the population of Finland or rather the population's chances of survival. Can the chief weapon of Finland's armed forces be the infantry any longer? Is the Army, which depends on general military service and would during hostilities take the majority of the working population away from their essential civilian occupations, a necessary or a dangerous factor?

I myself am of the opinion that defending Finland's air space is essential, but from the viewpoint of the inhabitants of Finland, not anyone else's interests. Such a defense policy, which would be linked with the protection of the population, would mean that the Finnish armed forces' most important weapons would be the Air Force and specifically antiaircraft defense. According to this plan, the main geographical points of defense would be the population centers. This plan would exclude Northeastern Lapland.

At best the present defense plan may be regarded as containing a deterrence component in terms of which it would be in keeping with both NATO and the Soviet Union's interests to frighten them away from Finnish Lapland. I see the Lapland defense plan in another light. The Lapland defense plan gives rise to expectations on the part of both military powers as to what the Finnish armed forces would do in that area during a war. On the basis of their expectations, Finland would have to go over to one or the other side. That is why the Norwegians' eager belief that the Finns would defend themselves and General Rogers' original doubts are two different sides of the same issue. Now General Rogers is more satisfied. His satisfaction is not based on admiration for the symmetrical defense of neutrality, but on the sentry post of the West.

Against my line of reasoning it might be argued that, as a military vacuum, Lapland would offhand attract the troops of a foreign power. I would reply to this in the following manner: If that were to happen, it would mean a fundamental change in NATO strategy and Norwegian defense policy, a point to which I will return in a moment. The Soviet Union's interests would remain unchanged, regardless of whether the Finnish Army were in Northeastern Lapland or not.

At the regional level — I mean Lapland — Finland's security policy has not been very successful these past few years. In this sector it has been easier to increase the military investment than to carry out foreign policy measures aimed at protecting the Nordic area. At this point it is worth our while to take a closer look at Urho Kekkonen's Lapland policy.

Kekkonen's Lapland Policy

In the speech President Urho Kekkonen delivered on 29 November 1965, he proposed "treaty arrangements with Norway which would protect the border area between Finland and Norway from any military action, also in the event of a conflict between the superpowers." It is regrettable that this proposal, which is still on Finland's security policy agenda and is mentioned in the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee report, was not received with sympathy in Norway at the time. Instead, another kind of guarantee was approved in Norwegian-Finnish relations: It was decided to strengthen the garrison at Sodankyla. President Mauno Koivisto returned to the political side of the question during his recent visit to Norway.

There were contradictory features in Urho Kekkonen's Lapland policy. As president he to a certain extent viewed armed neutrality with favor, as was evident, among other things, in his letter of 27 January 1969 to General Keininon. Kekkonen also referred to the problem of the defense of Lapland in various speeches he made.

On the other hand, Kekkonen presented initiatives that represented another way of thinking with regard to security policy. The most important of these was the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free Nordic zone, which is really a proposal to neutralize Northern Europe.

Since NATO military forces are prepared to use nuclear weapons if need be to ward off a conventional attack, the relevance of Kekkonen's nuclear-free Nordic zone proposal is obvious. This is, however, a political initiative — militarily the realization of such a zone cannot be a patent solution, as General Rogers has justifiably noted. Its realization would, nevertheless, be a better solution than for Finland to opt in favor of one or the other military powers for the sake of defending Lapland.

Recently many opportunities to promote a nuclear-free Nordic zone have not been taken advantage of. The debates in the Norwegian Labor Party government in the spring of 1981 and the Brezhnev interview with the Finnish Social Democrats in June of the same year offered opportunities to present initiatives or at least enter into negotiations. Alva Myrdal's proposal for a minizone could have been an incentive for the establishment of a zone that would have covered the whole Nordic area.

Finnish foreign policy seems to be tied to the balance of an outdated bipolarized world. It is waiting for — in somewhat worried fashion, to be sure — the world imbalance to be corrected. This being the case, Finnish foreign policy does not want to do anything that might possibly interfere with this restoration of the balance, nor does it want to make any decision that would

mean that Finland would get involved in differences of opinion between super-powers. General Rogers' statement indicates, however, once again — and Matti Klemola quite rightly emphasized this "once again" — that NATO would not view the establishment of a nuclear-free Nordic zone very favorably. Finland, which has already committed itself to the establishment of a nuclear-free Nordic area, has made its choice. It merely has /to act/ in light of that choice.

We should note that 4 years ago Prof Osmo Apunen proposed the creation of such an arrangement, with the aid of which the present nuclear-free situation in the Nordic area could be reinforced, by means of a system of on-going consultations among the Nordic countries, among other things. Nothing has been done with respect to this sensible proposal. Recently Prof Allan Rosas and managing director Max Jakobson — each in his own way — have made efforts to revive the idea of a joint proclamation by the Nordic countries to preserve a nuclear-free Nordic area. These are modest, but worthwhile proposals.

The Finnish conception of neutrality has been closely tied to that of armed neutrality, which in itself has been a factor in the growing investment of military resources in the Nordic countries. On the other hand, as far as neutrality /policy/ is concerned, one sometimes gets the impression that it has slightly regressed recently. It has turned into a broad peace-seeking policy and often its preferred form is the investigation of some problem or other. But neutrality refers to a given area and the protection of its inhabitants — otherwise, we may simply speak of just peaceful foreign policy.

A neutrality policy must be active during a time of crisis, as was Urho Kekkonen's neutrality policy during the diplomatic note crisis when he succeeded in getting Article 2 of the YYA excluded. A neutrality policy must also be active in time of peace, when its main job is the improvement of the local environment. The political and diplomatic focal point must be more and more in the Nordic area and in Central Europe. In my opinion, the reply to General Rogers should be constructed along these lines.

11,406

CSO: 3617/118

VINKA TRAINER MAY BE PRODUCED IN TURBOPROP MODEL

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 25 Apr 83 p 21

[Text] The Valmet plant in Kuorevesi tries to develop a new version of the Vinka trainer by providing it with a turboprop engine. The Vinka series of 30 planes ordered by the air forces was already completed two years ago, but despite several attempts, the manufacturers have not succeeded in selling the plane abroad.

However, the manufacturers in Kuorevesi are not willing to give up, and the Vinka plane will be once again transported for display at the Paris Air Show next summer. At the Paris Air Show, also the latest Finnish airplane, Valmet Pik 23 Towmaster, made of reinforced plastic will be displayed. There are two prototypes of it. It is designed for towing gliders as well as for training pilot students.

The Vinka equipped with a turboprop engine is known by the project code name Valmet TV-320/400 Turbovinha. The type has just reached the planning and research phase, and no decisions have been made on its manufacturing says Juhani Makinen, plant manager of the Valmet plant in Kuorevesi.

The market potential for the Turbovinha has not been investigated so far, but according to plant manager Makinen, the manufacturers have kept in mind the training needs of the air forces as well as those of commercial airlines, which prefer a solution like the Turbovinha. In addition to its function as a trainer, the new type could be used as "a poor man's" battle helicopter. This idea has gained support also in foreign newspapers.

The development department of the aviation industry (IKO) tries to secure with its plans the continuation of airplane manufacture in Finland, which, as of now, seems to be ending in 1985 when the last of the 46 Hawk-trainer battle-planes assembled in Finland will be completed.

12190

CSO: 3617/117

PROCUREMENT, USE OF STINGER ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILES

The Hague LEGERKOERIER in Dutch Apr 83 pp 6-7

[Article: "'Stinger' Supersonic Rocket Improves Air Defense"]

[Text] With the introduction in 1984 of the Stinger, the defense against light aircraft and helicopters will improve considerably. Although the Stinger is a rocket system and can be operated by one man from his shoulder, it is not, within the concept of the Royal Landforces, a weapon system to be deployed individually. In terms of that concept, this weapon system will be deployed exclusively in combination with the 35 mm antiaircraft armored caterpillar (Prtl), commonly dubbed 'pruttel' ["simmer" or "grouch"]. According to Engineer Colonel T.J.F. Roes, head of the air defense project bureau responsible for the introduction of the Stinger, the Stinger and the 'pruttel' are mutually complementary systems. The 'pruttel' is mainly used against directly approaching targets and the Stinger, in principle, against passing and manoeuvring targets. Naturally, the manner of deployment depends on the situation which obtains at the moment, the weather, the landscape and the altitude. In addition, the 'pruttel' can use its radar, while the Stinger must be used against a visually sightable target. (This may look like a disadvantage, but, when the visibility is poor, light aircraft and helicopters cannot see anything either).

But what is this Stinger? Colonel Roes: 'As far as the Stinger is concerned, we are talking about a "weapon round" and a "missile round." The "weapon round" is the ready weapon system which consists of the rocket, the grasp and the firing mechanism. After the firing, there is only a "missile round," a separately packed rocket, necessary for the next shot.'

Rocket Always Explodes

The Stinger is in fact a supersonic rocket weighing 16 kg. Supersonic means that it can reach the speed exceeding the speed of sound. The rocket consists of a guiding system which includes a seeking component and a steering system.

The rocket is provided with an explosive charge triggered by a percussion fuse. In case it misses its target, a self-destruction mechanism makes sure that a fired rocket explodes at all times.

In connection with the very short reaction time, there is a launching engine which makes it possible to start the rocket with the highest possible speed. The normal propulsion section consists of a flight motor with solid fuel. Due to the rocket principle, the gunner receives no recoil at the time of the firing. The only thing he notices is the sudden drop of the rocket's weight. What are, then, the actions that the gunner must perform? When the target is actually approaching, the weapon is placed on one's shoulder and the cooling unit brought for the battery. Then the gunner removes the protective plate and cracks open the visor. In the first instance, the rocket fires off at the infra-red source of the target, namely the engine whose heat causes the infrared radiation. To make sure that its target is annihilated, the rocket automatically adjusts its course to make sure that the target is hit before the engine. One of the great advantages of this weapon system is the fact that no support is necessary. Both the "weapon round" and the "missile round" are hermetically sealed and carried in handy crates.

Colonel Roes: 'While training Stinger shooters, exclusive use must be made of simulators. But the experienced units should also use a Stinger-imitator. The Stinger shooters should never fire an actual shot. But that is no problem. To perform all actions, besides aiming also the mounting, the tracking and the firing, a simple and inexpensive "field handling trainer" is used beforehand. With its help, one can learn to handle the stinger even in the field. For practicing on real aircraft--the shooter even then hears the real beep tone if he aims well--one should use the "tracking head trainer," a complete Stinger simulator. This "tracking head trainer" can also be combined with a "launch simulator," so that the firing could also be imitated, including noise and smoke.'

People at the Board of the Royal Army Materiel (DMKL) have two systems in mind for training under operative circumstances, one American and one British made. With both Dome-trainer systems, all kinds of attacks and variable factors of weather and terrain can be imitated in the best possible natural manner.

Effective

Of the 464 Stingers bought in the first installment, 324 are intended for the Royal Army, 100 for the Royal Airforce, while 40 go to the Marine Corps. Colonel Roes: 'Both training and maintenance of the training equipment is being carried out jointly at the Antiaircraft Artillery School in Ede. As to the further production of the Stinger and in particular the Stinger post, a joint European production of this weapon system is in preparation, in which the Netherlands also takes part.'

12391

CSO: 3614/100

IMPACT OF ECONOMIZING ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES VIEWED

The Hague ONS LEGER in Dutch Apr 83 pp 34-41

[Article by J.L. van Zwet: "The Royal Navy, Under Pressure from Necessary Economy Measures, Temporarily Slower and Slower..."]

[Text] However difficult it may be for a part of the armed forces whose main tasks are related to the sea to digest this, the Royal Navy will have to maintain the current 10 percent sailing limitation until 1984 and will have to continue to limit speeds at sea. The resulting drop in energy consumption is part of the Ministry of Defense's contribution to the far-reaching economy measures implemented in our country in order to enable us to withstand the consequences of the serious economic crisis in which the Western world finds itself. The use of energy will remain subject to limitations over the whole range of the armed forces, hence also in the army and the air force.

According to responses by Ministry of Defense officials to questions raised in the Second Chamber in connection with a relevant sentence in the explanatory memorandum attached to the 1983 defense budget, the extent to which training goals can be achieved in all three sections of the armed forces, hence also in the navy, has dropped to an extreme minimum because of the fuel savings. However, the economy measures are deemed to be acceptable because they are of a temporary nature. As far as the Royal Navy is concerned, "low speed" still applies in the performance of its tasks.

The Royal Navy's main task is anti-submarine warfare. Three escort groups are intended for operations in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Channel, and one for operations in the North Sea and adjoining areas. The fleet plan provides for 21 frigates for operations in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Channel. In 1983, the last 3 of the 10 new standard frigates of the Kortenaer class will be added to the fleet. This year, all six of the modernized frigates of the Van Speijk class will be back in service. In addition to the 2 armed escort frigates, the escort groups have 18 ships allocated for their task. By the end of this year, the temporary shortage of eight frigates, which occurred in 1982, will have been reduced to three.

Two anti-aircraft frigates, which will form the Jacob van Heemskerck class, are still under construction. The question of how to meet the need for the lacking frigate is still under study. They are considering the possibility of combining it with the construction of M (multi-purpose) frigates for the North

Sea, planned for later years, which will have to take the place of the frigates of the Wolf class.

Of the six ships in this class, four are still operational. Three of these are in service and one is in reserve. A few of them play a role in fishing inspection.

Air Defense

The great importance of good air defense for the fleet was once again made very clear in the recent conflict in the Falkland Islands. Medium range air defense will improve considerably once the frigates of the Van Heemskerck class have been put in service. A problem in this respect is the lack of a (very) short range air defense system against low flying, fast targets. But such a weapons system will be available in the foreseeable future. They are working hard on the development of a Goalkeeper gun system. In 1980, the Ministry of Defense entered into a contract for the further development and construction of a prototype. This fully automatic weapon consists of an American rapid-fire gun (4,200 shots per minute) and a fire control system developed by Sigrual. The first tests with the prototype are on the agenda for this year. The development appears to be very promising. They are striving to install this weapons system as soon as possible on the Dutch ships. For the time being it looks as if the first weapons will become available in 1985.

Submarine

An indispensable element in the whole set of resources for anti-submarine warfare is the submarine itself. The navy has six of these ships, four of which are eligible for replacement. Two ships are being built and, anticipating the arrival of the first one in 1985, it was deemed responsible not to give the oldest ship, the more than 20 year old H.M. Dolphin, a substantial overhaul -- which would be lengthy and costly --, but to put it in reserve. In order to further lighten the investments costs, the mid-life modernization of the two submarines of the Swordfish class -- the Swordfish and the Tiger Shark -- has been postponed for a few years. The construction of the two submarines of the Walrus class, which had run into delays because in further developing the specifications it turned out that a change in the specifications was needed, in the form of a lengthening of the machine room complex by one frame, is now running according to plan. The trial run for the first ship has been set for mid-1985.

A significant improvement in anti-submarine warfare was provided by the addition of F3C-Orion patrol planes, which replace the naval air force's Neptunes, which have since been taken out of service and largely dismantled.

When all 13 Orions have been delivered by the end of 1984, they will form, together with the Brequet-Atlantics, a naval air fleet which meets the demands of the times.

The Orion can be equipped with torpedoes, fitted with conventional charges. At this time, these torpedoes are still suitable to be used, under virtually all circumstances, against most nuclear and conventional submarines. In addition to nuclear depth charges, the airplane is adequately armed for anti-submarine warfare. Given the gradually increasing threat from surface ships, they intend, in addition to the frigates, also to equip the Orion planes with the Harpoon (air to surface) weapons system. The date for this will have to be determined later. But there is every indication that this will not be earlier than the late eighties.

Seventeen Lynx helicopters are intended for anti-submarine warfare from ships belonging to the escort groups. The other five are used for reconnaissance and rescue operations from shore.

Meanwhile, the Lynx helicopters which were ordered have already been delivered. The extent to which it will be possible to replace the Wasp helicopters sold to Indonesia and the two Lynx aircraft which were lost last year, is still under study.

Anti-mine Warfare

The navy's capacity for anti-mine warfare with modern means will be substantially increased this year. The first ship of the Alkmaar class of anti-mine vessels, the Alkmaar, has completed its first trial run. The "tripartite" project with France and Belgium is making way. A total of 15 anti-mine vessels is being built by Van der Giessen-De Noord.

The very outdated shallow water minesweepers of the Van Straelen class were taken out of service for cost-effectiveness considerations. This has produced problems for the navy relative to the sweeping of very narrow waterways and arms of the sea, and the sweeping of very sensitive mines. The former task will be taken over by minesweepers of the Dokkum class. The latter will be partly taken over by mine hunters of the Alkmaar class, which have been gradually introduced into the organization this year since 1 February. It is expected that by 1990 the complement of minesweepers will once again be complete.

Marine Corps

It is not possible, within the proposed budget, to buy a separate ship for the transportation of the amphibian combat groups of the Marine Corps. The possibility of also using the (third) naval supply ship, to be built according to plan in the late eighties, for the transportation of the amphibian combat groups of the Marine Corps is under study.

But a real amphibian ship remains high on the wish list of the Corps. The retiring major general of the Marine Corps, J.J.A. den Haan, and the new Major General T. Rudolphie at the recent transfer of command, stressed the importance of it. For the time being, the Dutch marines remain dependent on transportation from the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force, to which they are detached operationally and logistically. The British navy itself is also fighting problems. A number of transport ships are slated to be withdrawn from the force in the eighties.

The amphibian transport capacity of the British recently sustained a serious blow through the loss of two ships during the Falkland conflict. As a matter of fact, the Falkland crisis did not cause any problems for the Dutch marines. Their training program could be completed normally, in spite of the involvement of the British marines, with whom the Dutch work together in a training context, in the crisis.

F-27

The two F-27 naval patrol planes currently operating in the Netherlands Antilles, are functioning well. The management of the planes is handled jointly by the air force and the navy. The task of station ship in the Netherlands Antilles has been taken over by a Van Speijk class frigate from the last pursuit vessel of the Friesland class, which was taken out of service and sold.

Integration of Women

Integration of women in the Royal Navy is continuing unabatedly, albeit not completely without difficulties. The Royal Navy Institute [KIM] in Den Helder will be opened to women this year in September. According to statements from the Royal Na. 's personnel department there is no lack of eagerness, as the ladies are tapping their feet with impatience. The areas of study for female naval cadets will have to be of a temporary nature because the ultimate job opportunities will be determined only on the basis of experience with trial runs at sea.

As far as the trial run with women on board the H.M. Zuiderkruis is concerned, it was the opinion of the project group "Women in the Royal Navy" that "the whole set of experiences" with a mixed crew "and what has been learned from it" should be a reason to continue with the placing of women on board of sailing ships. However, the VBZ [expansion unknown], the organization whose task it is to defend the interests of all navy personnel below the rank of officer, stated that it was opposed to it. But the political leadership in the Ministry of Defense finally decided that "taking into account the recommendations made in the 'Going to Sea with Women' report," the project of mixed crews will be continued. Relative to a further introduction of women on other ships, a cautious policy will be pursued, whereby -- partly on the basis of the number of available female military personnel and taking into account the possibilities of good supervision -- for the time being only two ships will be involved. In the "Going to Sea with Women" report, the "Women in the Royal Navy" project group evaluated the experiment of sailing for more than a year with a mixed crew on board the supply ship H.M. Zuiderkruis and a subsequent longer lasting trip to the United States.

Retirement Age for Military Personnel

Another personnel matter which has seriously stirred up feelings in the navy is that of the retirement age for military personnel. Everybody is not in agreement with the raising of the retirement age. For the time being, the situation is that a policy proposal has been submitted to the Central Consultative Organization for Military Personnel [CGOM] and to the Second Chamber,

for adjustment of the retirement age for military personnel. In principle, it assumes a general maximum retirement age of 58 years for all military personnel. Because this step is too big for the Royal Navy and because it is desirable no longer to have differences in the general retirement age for military personnel, this increase to 58 years of age will be accomplished in two steps, whereby, in a first step for the navy -- just as in the air force and the army --, the retirement age of 55 years will be introduced. The Royal Navy has been requested to develop models which will ultimately lead to a general retirement age of 55 years, with implementation of an acceptable transition arrangement. Furthermore, plans are to be drawn up for keeping eligible military personnel in service on a voluntary basis.

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CSC: 3614/105

FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE'S HOLST ON SOVIET SUBMARINE MOTIVES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 7 May 83 p 2

[Article by Johan Jorgen Holst: "U-Boat Episodes?"]

[Text] Now that the submarine hunt in the Hardanger fjord is over, it may be useful to look at the episode in a broader context. The minister of defense has asked for an investigation of how the operation was executed. I think this will be useful. Meanwhile, it is hoped that the investigation will not be too narrow in scope, that it will include the political decisions, the teamwork between the military and political authorities and the intelligence service as well. The political and military issues are just a small aspect of the spectrum of problems which fall under crisis management. We have little experience with this here in Norway; we have poorly developed procedures and faulty organization. It is important to learn from our experiences.

But there are also other types of questions which arise. The submarine hunt in western Norway was going on simultaneously with a new submarine hunt off Sundsvall in Sweden, which happened just after the sensational report about the submarine episode in Harsfjorden last fall came out. Are we confronted with escalation here? Is there a pattern to this activity which signifies renewed and reinforced pressure on the Scandinavian peninsula? We will be cautious about drawing hasty conclusions.

However, it is obvious that it is in fact sensational if it is true that new submarine aggression directed at the Sundsvall area was set in motion just after the Swedish protest statement of the previous month. It is, of course, possible that we are confronted with a kind of time lag, that it was a program which was going to be followed anyway. But if the decision system over there is so slow that it was not caused by the protest or the report from the Swedish Submarine Commission, then uncomfortable questions are going to arise concerning political control over military forces. If they did decide to ignore the protests and reports, that would mean a political statement regarding the tendency of a superpower to engage in activities which are uncomfortable for smaller nations. If these missions against Sweden were seen as so important that the political consequences were thought acceptable, very uncomfortable questions arise concerning the intentions of the abovementioned superpower toward Sweden. These questions presume that the submarines were already on the way, and what we know points toward that fact, but we don't know for sure if it's true.

There is great uncertainty bound up with our data here. We have no dependable overview of the number of infringements of Scandinavian waters by foreign submarines. It was only at Karlskrona that a submarine was actually detected. Statistics about possible submarine violations would tell as much about our coastal vigilance as about what was actually happening underwater. We know that a kind of chain reaction is in evidence. The moment that public attention is directed toward possible submarine aggression, the reports increase of other possible violations. Attentiveness rise and expectations increase.

It is difficult to see any definite pattern when it comes to the intention behind the possible submarine missions in the Scandinavian area. In Sweden, it looks as if attention is being directed toward military installations; in Norway, it looks as though mapping, and training with an eye toward better possibilities for operations against enemy vessels in war, could be a motive.

Furthermore, it is difficult to see what political goals regarding Scandinavia could be served by such infringements. Insofar as the submarines have not been identified, we don't even know who is transmitting what possible signals. The most obvious "suspect" says "not guilty". Besides, there are no accompanying explanations which could help us interpret possible signals so that we could pick up the "message." The episodes do not reflect, for example, any escalation in the Soviet press concerning the Scandinavian countries or aspects of their politics. Objectively seen, there are also few grounds for any assumption that strategic interest in or occupation with Scandinavia on the part of the superpowers is increasing. Scandinavia continues to be a strategically sensitive area, but there is no dramatic change at hand in the pattern of restraint, in the intent to maintain a situation of the lowest possible tension.

Meanwhile, recent signs indicate that naval issues are being granted increased attention in the escalating competition of the superpowers. Marshall Kulikov, who is high commander of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, has announced that naval war needs must be granted an increased significance; a large-scale plan for expanding the American navy is soon to be underway. But this has to do with possible future trends, not with past events. Submarine hunts have occurred both in more relaxed times as well as in more tense times. The last large-scale Norwegian submarine hunt occurred in the Sognefjord in 1972, long before things got tense. It is also somewhat difficult to explain why a heightening in American-Soviet tension would result in Soviet aggression towards Sweden.

There are reasons to assume that submarine activities in the waters around the Scandinavian peninsula have become routine, that they are the result of the expansion of the navy of a new superpower. Submarine violations have been seen to involve little risk. They are, therefore, perhaps less subject to political administration. We have seen many examples of a military instrument creating new demands for protection and operational freedom. Free access to the seas, insurance against being blockaded and the possibility of hunting down an opponent's forces necessitate expanded requirements in preparing and assuring an advantage. This increases the dilemma for the Scandinavian countries. On the one hand, having the fleet of a superpower as a

neighbor increases the danger that the Scandinavian area may become the theater for a competitive attack whose intention is to secure operational possibilities for a global power instrument. This creates new demands for protection against isolation and surprise attacks in the Scandinavian area. On the other hand, the Scandinavian countries also have an interest in hindering an escalation of naval competition in northern waters. This could lead to increased aggression towards Scandinavia and threaten the low-tension condition which has characterized the area up to now. Expansion of the Soviet northern fleet, the stepping up of operations in the Norwegian Sea and the development of aircraft carriers and sea-based cruise missiles all increase the possibility of aggression toward Scandinavia. But there are also good reasons that we in Norway, to alleviate the pressure, should remain skeptical of possible plans by the Americans to step up their naval presence in peacetime. It has been an important part of the low-tension situation that neither of the superpowers maintains permanent naval patrols in the Norwegian Sea (as they do in the Mediterranean, for example). It would also not be in Norway's interest if American naval strategy in wartime turned out to place increased emphasis on an early attack on Soviet naval base areas, since that would increase the danger of explosion and escalation of crises which might arise in the Nordic area. It has been an important goal in Norwegian alliance policy to keep alliances from leading to a condition where animosity between our large neighbor nation and our foremost ally would cause increased aggression toward Norway. This is why a policy of restraint has been so important. Norway has been able to combine a consideration for protection and for a reduction of tension while balancing between the extremes of provocation and appeasement. We need the support of allies; but Norway must, on as broad a basis as possible, avoid an escalation of the competitive situation between our allies and our large neighbor nation in the Nordic area so that this competitive situation causes and intensifies crisis conditions in our area. Arguments over Norwegian security policy in the postwar era have in fact all had to do with differences of opinion as to where the point of balance should be placed.

Submarine episodes tend to bring a chill into the political climate. It was chilly enough to start with. Naval activities cast political shadows. This shadow-casting must be suppressed. For this reason, on Norway's part, we need to evaluate whether we can present proposals to a conference on disarmament and security and trust-promoting actions in Europe to reduce the inclination to violate time-honored rules and to reduce aggression on the part of a superpower's naval forces. Acts of obligation to refrain from naval demonstrations would be a possibility. Further, it could be useful to tie in established international law regarding submarines with rules for de-escalation and cooperation in Europe, thereby keeping political thresholds from being overstepped. It could be useful, similarly, to repeat the principle that submarines innocently transiting another nation's waters should travel on the surface and that such vessels should not be permitted to enter inner waters, that is, inside the coastal limits, without permission from the nation involved. It could further be useful to come to an agreement about procedures for warnings directed at submarines which, by navigational error, may come inside the territorial line or coastal limit, so that these vessels can have the opportunity to make an "honorable retreat." Further, it could be useful to determine that the responsibility for the consequences of not heeding requests to come to the surface must be borne by the nation of the vessel involved. There is no question here of making new rules but rather of politically reinforcing the established norms of conduct.

STANDARDS IN ARMED FORCES REPORTED TO BE DROPPING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 May 83 p 5

[Article by Knut Falchenberg: "Lowering of Standards Threatens Our Ability to Face an Attack"]

[Text] Norwegian soldiers will hardly end up as cannon fodder for the enemy if war breaks out. We Norwegians have learned to fight back. But the shortages currently affecting a number of aspects of our defense program will have their inevitable effect on the newest crop of recruits. Some commentators are already talking about a lowering of standards in the armed forces. Regular testing currently indicates that proficiency in various disciplines, including military technology, ABC defense and servicing mines, has declined.

For various reasons, the quality of the branches of the Norwegian military is seldom or never dealt with at length in public documents. We can read all the way through the wide-ranging, long-term plans of the Defense Department, which have just been released, without getting any real answer to the main question: Do the army, navy and air force measure up when it comes to meeting a threat? But internally the Defense Department and NATO are occupied with approaching the problem, and inspections and tests are being conducted on a large-scale basis.

A document recently prepared by the army staff in the Defense High Command attempts to cover developmental trends in 18 disciplines. The basis for the report was thousands of individual tests. Six graphs show uphill curves, which indicates that the level of expertise is improving. But twice that many graphs, 12 in all, have downhill curves, and in a majority of the disciplines the level falls under the red mark, which indicates that 70 percent of the troops tested passed the requirements of the test.

Included in these poor results was the test involving the use of a map and compass, which was passed by only 62 percent. The curve for the military technology test, also, goes downhill; in this case, only 64 percent of the troops passed the tests with satisfactory marks. Similar results, as well as worse ones, were achieved in other important disciplines. It should be

mentioned that, in testing, there are often small margins between "pass" and "fail," but the trends which have been monitored from 1981 to 1982 correspond more or less with the long-term overviews which have been drawn up.

In modern war it is the troops, not individual heroic performances, which ensure victory. New, advanced technology alleviates the growing demands for cooperation and leadership. But cooperation was exactly the element which was most unsatisfactory in the "Viking" maneuvers held in March. The analyses show that the troops will have to improve in coordinating their infantry with the artillery and the corps of engineers. Cooperation between artillery and infantry was exactly what the British emphasized as important after the Falkland Islands campaign. In that limited war, five batteries of field artillery alone shot off 17,500 grenades. It is unlikely in the case of certain types of special ammunition--for example, light grenades, which are useful in driving back a night attack--that the entire Norwegian preparedness stockpiles would suffice for comparable use.

After the "Cold Winter" maneuvers, a local newspaper showed the headline "Norwegian Soldiers Beaten on Home Turf," while the commander of the maneuver, Major General Arne Fosnes, announced to AFTENPOSTEN that the British soldiers were better trained for a winter war than the Norwegians themselves! A question arises as to whether other foreigners, who have had 2 years of difficult military service in the Leningrad military district, can also "beat the Norwegian soldiers on their home turf."

The pessimists include Lieutenant Colonel Rolv Brandtzaeg, who has been spokesman for the reserve officers for some years. As a group, the reserve officers make up the backbone of defense mobilization. Brandtzaeg was recently called in on a war maneuver as an evaluator in a battalion. He followed the maneuver all the way through using his own observation via the communication network and through contact with other evaluators and maneuver leaders. He reported: "It is with regret that I have come to the conclusion that the mobilization brigade that participated would not have lasted a week against the standing brigade in northern Norway. Their weaknesses were many and obvious. In general, the mobilization units worked together poorly, and they functioned more slowly than their opponents. The divisions had their hands full enough with internal administration and supply distribution in order to keep themselves alive that they had nothing left for the war itself. Patrolling and watch duty also were at a low standard. Many times the divisions were cut off by their opponents and evaluated out of the battle, and during the last phase of the maneuver they could not even manage the counterattack which was part of the plan, evaluator Brandtzaeg wrote in a report to the Defense Leadership Council. He said it was incredible that in the review session after the maneuver the leaders spent more time thanking and praising each other than examining the performance critically.

"I wouldn't be that pessimistic about the situation", Army General Inspector Egil Ingebrigtsen commented to AFTENPOSTEN.

"Mobilization units are a little slower, and details are attended to later and more sloppily than is the case with a standing division or a completely professional unit. But our practice repetition sessions show clear improvements after just a few days of practice," Major General Ingebrigtsen says. "The first few 24-hour periods after mobilization are critical."

He admits that it may be partially correct that inside the State Department and NATO there are tendencies to paint pretty pictures of each other and be overgenerous with "bouquets" after a maneuver. "But the underlaying truth is always there to be found, and I can promise that we, both nationally and internationally, carefully analyze the results of our maneuvers. We don't hide the weak points under the rug," he says.

Rear Admiral Carsten A Lutken, who heads the operational staff in the high command, reminds us that civil training, leave and benefits and reduced work time for the leadership have had the result that there is less effective time for training. For this reason there have been recent cutbacks in the training programs for the troops.

Ingebrigtsen said: "Our attempts to improve the situation at first produced a rising curve. But then this positive trend ran into a 'resource curve' which was on the way down, and the result was that we didn't get the funds for all of the training programs. Expanding our use of testing among the troops is one method we use to locate and correct weak points."

Admiral Lutken said that NATO has requested general review sessions every year or every other year. Norwegian divisions, as a rule, are trained every 4 years, or even less often. The day-long program is sufficient, he thinks.

While Soviet soldiers go through tough, long workdays, with few leaves or benefits, a Norwegian soldier's life continues to grow less demanding. Major General Ingebrigtsen says that if we reduce our efforts on all fronts--practice session, initial training, ammunition, etc.--then we will naturally come to a moral dilemma, in which the military leaders will have to ask themselves whether it would be irresponsible to send soldiers onto the battlefield at all. But up to now we have not been able to say that Norwegian soldiers would be sacrificed as "cannon fodder."

Rear Admiral Lutken said that when international rating teams from NATO give out ratings to Norwegian air divisions, most of the units rate a "satisfactory," which is a reasonable rating.

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CIVIL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION IN NEED FOR NEWER EQUIPMENT

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 27 Apr 83 p 12

[Article by Erik Lie: "Worn-Out Equipment; Fewer Practice Sessions for Teams"]

[Text] The civil defense program needs new equipment and materiel amounting to 330 million kroner. Large portions of the technical equipment have been unusable for some time. Probably no more than 11-12 million kroner are spent every year for new supplies.

The situation, already desperate, gets worse every year.

The fire-fighting equipment especially is in miserable condition. Over half of the civil defense program's well over 1,300 fire extinguishers is over 20 years old. Altogether 89 percent of Oslo's fire extinguishers are of this type. Spare parts are impossible to obtain and must be manufactured specially.

The fire hoses are also in poor condition and could burst at any point.

Vehicles

The situation is no better as regards other equipment. A large number of civil defense trucks date from the early sixties. Some of the specialized vehicles were purchased as far back as 1959.

There is, in addition, a vast shortage of stockpiled compressors and power saws. Out of the total of 341 motor compressors which are needed, 169 are lacking. Of 341 power saws, 106 are lacking. Many of the power saws have not been approved by the Labor Commission.

"The main problem for us is spare parts," says office manager Rolv Hartmark of the Civil Defense Directorate. "It is impossible to get spare parts for the oldest equipment. So it doesn't help much to keep up the technical standard on that equipment."

The civil defense program up to now has acquired equipment worth 346 million kroner, including maintenance. The municipalities have purchased 4-5 million kroner worth of equipment.

This means that the need for new equipment and materiel equals the purchase price of the materiel which has already been acquired.

Particularly since the mid-seventies, the civil defense program has fought for low budgets. Lately, funds have been appropriated from the educational sector in order to meet the more pressing demands.

However, the purchase of technical equipment cannot be assigned priority before 1987.

Fewer Practice Sessions for Teams

A 10-day basic course and an 18-hour practice review every other year. This is the preparation civil defense teams have been given for meeting possible future catastrophe situations.

The review practice sessions have, in other words, been cut in half for the 60,000 teams in the localized programs. The difficult economic situation has forced the civil defense program to cut back.

Department director Sverre Servan of the Civil Defense Directorate said to ARBEIDERBLADET that the change in the training program will mean weakening our civil defense. The change will not have any immediate drastic consequences in the short run, he thinks, because the basic training, both for teams and team leaders, will remain at the same level as it is now.

Small Appropriation

To maintain the review practice sessions at the same level as now, an extra appropriation of 2 million kroner had to be made. Servan does not think that the authorities consider civil defense of second-class importance. He finds it necessary to call attention to the fact that the civil defense program is inexpensive to run.

District preparedness chief Arne Rosnes, administrative officer for Oslo and Akershus, said to ARBEIDERBLADET that it is almost a tragedy that the team practice sessions are being cut back.

"Practice sessions at 2-year intervals seem to me to be satisfactory. Calling the teams together every 4 years is not enough. The contact between the teams and the leaders is lost. It is terribly important for the leaders to be trained to lead their teams," Rosnes said.

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CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTORATE WEIGHING GAS MASK PURCHASE

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 26 Apr 83 p 9

[Article by Erik Lie: "Bomb Shelters in Private Homes; Gas Masks for Civilians?"]

[Text] Norway's 2 million bomb shelters are unevenly distributed geographically.

In addition, the rate of construction of new shelters is much too slow.

The Civil Defense Directorate is currently proposing to reintroduce the requirements for building shelters in private homes.

The abovementioned requirement was in effect up to 1975. Since the requirement went out of effect, the construction of private bomb shelters has dropped drastically--from 90,000 annually to 50,000. The government builds, in addition to this, 5,000-6,000 shelters annually.

The result of the more liberal construction policy is that large housing areas have been constructed without a single bomb shelter. Now the Directorate's goal is to have shelters built near where people live.

More Restrictive Requirements

Today new construction sites over 150 square meters in area are required to have bomb shelters. This chiefly applies to business and office buildings. Excepted are service stations, day care centers and agricultural mills and factories. And private housing units.

In the opinion of the Directorate, regulations concerning bomb shelter construction should be drawn up along much more restrictive lines. The Directorate has examined the issue for a long time and will in a relatively short time present its proposals to the Justice Department.

Chief engineer Trond Balke of the Directorate said to ARBEIDERBLADET that various alternatives will be examined.

"We have no clear-cut idea of how the financing will be managed. Nor are we definite as to whether all types of housing units will fall under one requirement. But in principle we would like to see all housing covered," Balke said.

Public Shelters

Two-thirds of the cost for public bomb shelters will be covered by the state, while municipal funds will cover the rest.

"We have noticed an increase in interest from municipal authorities in the last few years. This is due in large degree to the fact that they see possibilities for multiple use of the shelters," explained Blake, pointing out the Holmlia shelter as a good example of this.

The shelter at Holmlia occupies an area in a mountain excavated by blasting. In peacetime, it contains a swimming pool, handball courts and a large area for school and athletic club activities in the area. The building can hold 7,000 people.

The capital area has 400,000 bomb shelters in all. Most of them are located in the downtown district. Cities and densely populated areas are generally better equipped with shelters than more rural settlements.

Gas Masks for Civilians?

All civilians should have their own gas masks. This is the recommendation of a committee which for 2 years has studied the necessity for defense equipment against chemical warfare techniques.

The four-man committee will publish its research in the course of a few days. Secretary Jon Martinsen does not want to go public yet with detailed information from the report, which is now being printed.

The committee was appointed by the so-called Coordinating Committee for ABC Affairs, and its administrators include the Defense High Command, the Defense Research Institute, the Civil Defense Directorate and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Science.

Every person living in Sweden has been supplied with a gas mask and plastic clothing for protection against possible catastrophes. In this country we do not have a program of this kind.

Director Tor Rolf Bryntesen of the Civil Defense Directorate told ARBEIDERBLADET that the distribution of gas masks has not been a priority matter because the danger of catastrophes has not been seen as imminent.

He announced that 380,000 gas masks are available in storage. If every Norwegian were to have his own mask, it would mean an expenditure in the billions.

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